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ARTICLE
GAMESTOP AND THE REEMERGENCE OF THE RETAIL
INVESTOR
JILL E. FISCH*

ABSTRACT
The GameStop trading frenzy in January 2021 was perhaps the highest profile
example of the reemergence of capital market participation by retail investors—
a marked shift from the growing domination of those markets by large
institutional investors. Some commentators have greeted retail investing, which
has been fueled by app-based brokerage accounts and social media, with alarm
and called for regulatory reform. The goals of such reforms are twofold. First,
critics argue that retail investors need greater protection from the risks of
investing in the stock market. Second, critics argue that the stock market, in turn,
needs protection from retail investors.
This Article challenges calls for broad regulatory reform. It reasons that,
although retail investing is likely to impact the capital markets, claims about the
harms from increased retail investing are overstated. More importantly, the
debate overlooks potential benefits from retail investing, both to investors
themselves and the capital markets. Regulators should not clamp down on the
conditions, such as commission-free trading, gamified trading platforms, and
the expanded use of social media, that have enabled a generation of new
investors to participate in the capital markets. These innovations, through their
ability to facilitate direct market participation by retail investors, have the
potential to democratize the capital markets and increase the connections
between ordinary citizens and U.S. businesses. Regulators should instead be
focusing on how to facilitate the effectiveness of that process.
This Article defends the reemergence of the retail investor and its potential
promise in enabling citizen capitalism—providing ordinary citizens with a stake
*
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in the nation’s productivity while, at the same time, increasing the accountability
of those businesses to societal interests. It explains that retail investment can
reduce the increasingly problematic power of institutional intermediaries. It
also holds the possibility of increasing corporate consideration of stakeholder
interests without the need for formal structural changes or heavy-handed
regulation.
Critically, however, effective citizen capitalism requires retail shareholders
to participate in the capital markets on an informed basis. Although the extent
to which the GameStop frenzy reflected rational investing behavior is
questionable, the frenzy drew retail investors to the market, and there is evidence
that retail investment and engagement will both continue and evolve. This
Article identifies opportunities to improve the retail investing experience,
including greater oversight of sources of investment information, limits on the
manipulative use by brokers of customer information, and the extension of
fintech innovation to mechanisms for improving financial literacy. Attention to
these concerns, rather than heavy-handed efforts to discourage retail investing,
will increase the effectiveness of the retail investor.
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INTRODUCTION
The GameStop trading frenzy in January 2021 marked a reemergence of the
retail investor in the securities markets.1 An unprecedented number of new and
largely inexperienced investors opened app-based brokerage accounts and began
trading so-called “meme stocks”—companies that included GameStop, AMC
Entertainment Holdings, Inc. (“AMC”), and Express.2 Interest in these stocks—
interest that critics argued was divorced from fundamentals—was fueled by
posts on social media.3 The trading led to high levels of market volatility and
charges of market manipulation.4 Several hedge funds that shorted the meme
stocks suffered significant trading losses,5 and at least one retail-oriented
brokerage firm faced dramatically increased capital requirements, forcing it to

1
Historically, most stock in the United States was owned by retail investors. Sarah Haan
notes, for example, that “a 1948 survey of major manufacturing corporations found that 91%
of common stockholders were individuals, and that those individuals (men, women, and joint
accounts) held a combined average of 59% of outstanding issues.” Sarah C. Haan, Corporate
Governance and the Feminization of Capital, 74 STAN. L. REV. 515, 526 n.45 (2022) (citing
Who Owns “Big Business”? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations (pt. 1), 87
TRS. & ESTS. 5, 6 (1948)). Although institutional investors own 70-80% of most large public
companies today, the institutionalization of the markets is a relatively recent phenomenon.
See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1961, 1962-63 (2010) [hereinafter Fisch, Securities Intermediaries] (“The ownership of
public equity has shifted substantially from retail to institutional investors since Congress
enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s.”); Jill E. Fisch, Mutual Fund Stewardship
and the Empty Voting Problem, 16 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 71, 72 (2021) [hereinafter
Fisch, The Empty Voting Problem].
2
See, e.g., Drew Harwell, ‘Holding the Line’ Gets Harder as GameStop Tanks, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2021, at A1 (describing “newbie” investors who “plowed billions of dollars
through Robinhood and other online brokerages into GameStop”); Caitlin McCabe & Caitlin
Ostroff, Meme Stock Rally Resumes, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2021, at B1 (characterizing
GameStop, AMC, and Express as meme stocks).
3
See, e.g., Reuters, How ‘Dank Memes’ Changed Wall Street: Understanding Crazy
Gamestop-Reddit Phenomenon, FIN. EXPRESS (Jan. 30, 2021, 4:58 PM),
https://www.financialexpress.com/investing-abroad/featured-stories/how-dank-memeschanged-wall-street-understanding-crazy-gamestop-reddit-phenomenon/2182611/
[https://perma.cc/8MYP-7LJS] (describing role of Reddit and other social media platforms in
GameStop stock trading).
4
See, e.g., Dave Michaels, GameStop Frenzy Prompts Criminal DOJ Probe—
Investigation to Look for Any Evidence of Market Manipulation in Recent Price Swings,
WALL ST. J, Feb. 12, 2021, at A1 (“Federal prosecutors are investigating whether market
manipulation or other types of criminal misconduct fueled the rapid rise last month in prices
of stocks such as GameStop Corp . . . .”).
5
See, e.g., Laurence Fletcher, Hedge Fund that Bet Against GameStop Shuts Down, FIN.
TIMES
(June
22,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/397bdbe9-f257-4ca6-b6001756804517b6 [https://perma.cc/R6LH-LMSM] (reporting “big losses” for Melvin Capital
and Light Street Capital).

2022]

GAMESTOP

1803

limit trading temporarily.6 Regulators demanded information,7 and in 2021,
Congress held four hearings.8
The GameStop frenzy may have been a product of the times—investors
confined by the pandemic lockdown and flush with stimulus checks seeking a
form of engagement and entertainment. Whether the new investors who
downloaded the Robinhood and Webull apps, lured perhaps by free stock
promotions and confetti, will continue as long-term direct investors or move on
with their lives remains to be seen. Their emergence, however, raises serious
questions about the role of retail investors in the capital markets.
In particular, the frenzy blindsided regulators that had largely become
accustomed to the invisibility of the retail investor. In recent years, most retail
investors’ purchases were intermediated through diversified mutual funds,

6
See, e.g., Avi Salzman, GameStop’s January Trading Halt—and the Search for a Fix,
BARRON’S (Feb. 24, 2021, 4:36 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/gamestop-tradingwas-halted-by-a-plumbing-problem-there-could-be-a-fix-51614193956 (observing that
Robinhood and “[o]ther brokers . . . placed limits on some transactions”).
7
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), for example, both launched an
investigation into the GameStop frenzy and initiated a request for information and public
comments on digital engagement practices. See Thornton McEnery, Opinion, After 9 Months
of Investigation into GameStop Stock Frenzy, the SEC Concludes that Things Got Crazy for
a
Second
There,
MARKETWATCH
(Oct.
18,
2021,
5:32
PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/after-9-months-of-investigation-into-gamestop-stockfrenzy-the-sec-concludes-that-things-got-crazy-for-a-second-there-11634592761 (describing
SEC’s report following its nine-month investigation into GameStop frenzy); Request for
Information and Comments on Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser Digital Engagement
Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 92766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5833, 86
Fed. Reg. 49067 (Sept. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Request for Comment on Digital Engagement
Practices] (seeking information on use of digital engagement practice by brokers and online
trading platforms).
8
See Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail
Investors Collide: Virtual Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021)
[hereinafter Game Stopped? Part I]; Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers,
Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part II: Virtual Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021) [hereinafter Game Stopped? Part II]; Game Stopped? Who
Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part III:
Virtual Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021) [hereinafter Game
Stopped? Part III]; Who Wins on Wall Street? GameStop, Robinhood, and the State of Retail
Investing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 117th Cong. (2021)
[hereinafter Who Wins on Wall Street?]. On June 24, 2022, the House Financial Services
Committee released a report on the GameStop frenzy. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN.
SERVS., 117TH CONG., GAME STOPPED: HOW THE MEME STOCK MARKET EVENT EXPOSED
TROUBLING BUSINESS PRACTICES, INADEQUATE RISK MANAGEMENT, AND THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE
AND
REGULATORY
REFORM
(2022),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/6.22_hfsc_gs.report_hmsmeetbp.irm.nlrf.p
df [https://perma.cc/B8K6-ETA6].
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retirement plans, and professional advisors.9 The role of these intermediaries
was to shelter retail investors from the risks associated with direct investing,
including poorly informed trades, insufficient diversification, costly products,
and fraud.10 Regulators focused their attention on protecting retail investors from
these intermediaries by questioning the size and structure of their fees and
seeking to mitigate potential conflicts of interest.11
The result of this intermediation was tremendous growth in the size and
importance of institutional investors.12 Institutional investors took up the mantle
of effecting market discipline through their trading decisions.13 Similarly,
institutional investors became the driving force behind shareholder voting, most
recently using the votes that they exercise on behalf of their beneficiaries to
demand that issuers pay greater attention to environmental, social, and
governance (“ESG”) issues such as climate change.14 Commentators now worry
that institutional investors exercise too much power—that their herding behavior
jeopardizes market stability and their common ownership limits the competitive
behavior of their portfolio companies.15 Remarkably little attention is paid,
however, to retail investors.
The GameStop frenzy upset these norms and, as such, poses new challenges
for capital market regulation. Critics argue that retail investors need to be
protected from the capital markets—from Reddit and gamification-fueled
investments in meme stocks and from using margin trading and options in
connection with those investments.16 These critics further argue that the capital
markets need to be protected from retail investors whose behavior contributes to
market volatility, increases systemic risk, and undermines allocational
9
See, e.g., Fisch, The Empty Voting Problem, supra note 1, at 72 (“[I]nstitutional investors
in the United States own 70-80% of the stock in large publicly-traded companies.”); Fisch,
Securities Intermediaries, supra note 1, at 1963 (reporting that, at the end of 2008, 92% of
the money in the mutual fund industry was contributed by the household sector).
10
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, The Knowledge Gap in
Workplace Retirement Investing and the Role of Professional Advisors, 66 DUKE L.J. 633,
638-42 (2016) (reporting “dramatic knowledge gap” in financial literacy between ordinary
people and investment professionals).
11
See Fisch, Securities Intermediaries, supra note 1, at 1965 (discussing regulatory efforts
to address intermediary excessive fees and conflicts of interest).
12
See John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve
13-14 (Harvard Pub. L. Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337
[https://perma.cc/593Q-9L26].
13
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288-89 (1991) (evaluating institutions’ use of
exit and voice in monitoring their portfolio companies).
14
See Fisch, The Empty Voting Problem, supra note 1, at 77-78 (describing BlackRock
and Vanguard’s support for shareholder proposals addressing climate change).
15
See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive
Common Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392, 1397-98 nn.12-14 (2020) (summarizing common
ownership literature).
16
See infra Section II.A.
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efficiency.17 Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
are investigating a variety of regulatory changes in response to these concerns
that could include restrictions on payment for order flow, transaction-based fees
or taxes, limits on the use of social media in connection with securities trading,
and increased compliance requirements for brokerage firms that serve the retail
market.18
In considering whether a regulatory response to the GameStop frenzy is
warranted, however, regulators should consider more carefully the potential
costs and benefits of increased retail participation in the securities markets. This
Article argues that existing calls for such a response have overstated the costs of
retail trading and overlooked the benefits. In particular, this Article challenges
the idea that it is somehow dangerous or inappropriate for retail investors to
purchase securities that are traded in the highly regulated U.S. public markets
and are issued by corporations that publish reports on a regular basis about their
financial condition and business operations that are audited and subject to SEC
oversight for accuracy.
The central contribution of this Article is to make the affirmative case for the
benefits of increased engagement by retail investors in the capital markets. This
Article explains that retail investing has the potential to increase the involvement
of ordinary citizens in the country’s economic development. The current trend
has engaged a population that has not traditionally participated in the capital
markets and offers them the opportunity to realize the economic rewards of such
participation. Retail investing offers a valuable counterpoint to the increased
concentration and herding by institutional investors, particularly the largest
mutual fund sponsors. Finally, retail investing has the potential to enhance the
accountability and legitimacy of business and its leaders.
This is not to understate the fact that a shift to increased retail investment
creates new challenges and is likely to impose costs. Investors will make
mistakes and lose money. Stock prices may be more volatile, and traditional
market participants will have to adjust their behavior to account for the
reemergence of retail. Rather than focusing on keeping retail investors out of the
17

See infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Sen., U.S. Senate, to Allison Herren Lee, Acting
Chair,
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
(Jan.
29,
2021),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01.29.2021%20Letter%20from%20Senator
%20Warren%20to%20Acting%20Chair%20Lee.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7D3-ZUEA] (asking
SEC to explain steps it will take to (1) “ensure that securities markets better reflect prices that
are in line with the intrinsic and fundamental value of underlying companies” and (2) “update
and implement rules defining market manipulation”); Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the Global Exchange and FinTech Conference (June 9, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-global-exchange-fintech-2021-06-09
[https://perma.cc/NEB2-SZJL] (“I’ve asked staff to make recommendations for the
Commission’s consideration on best execution, Regulation [National Market System],
payment for order flow (both on-exchange and off-exchange), minimum pricing increments,
and the [National Best Bid and Offer], with the aim of continuing to make our markets as
efficient as possible.”).
18
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market, however, this Article argues that the lesson for regulators from the
GameStop frenzy is the need to understand the new drivers of retail investing
and to ensure that those drivers promote informed and efficient investing
behavior. Toward that end, this Article focuses on the information sources used
by retail investors, the possible misuse of customer information by app-based
brokers, and the potential to harness the power of fintech to increase investor
financial literacy.
Beginning with a brief overview of the GameStop trading frenzy and its
extension to broader direct retail participation in the capital markets, this Article
then highlights the factors that likely contributed to the frenzy. Part II identifies
the problems that have been attributed to the increased retail participation in the
capital markets associated with the GameStop frenzy. Part III critically evaluates
these problems and argues that they are, for the most part, overstated. Part IV
defends increased retail engagement with the capital markets both from the
perspective of individual investors and broader society. Part V briefly identifies
lessons from GameStop about how to improve the retail investing experience.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE GAMESTOP FRENZY

Shares in GameStop stock increased from less than $4/share in July 2020 to
as high as $483 in January 2021.19 Millions of retail investors bought GameStop
stock in early 2021, and on several days it was the most actively traded stock on
Wall Street.20 Its price swings were so large that the New York Stock Exchange
halted trading six times in a single day.21 GameStop was the most visible of a
number of so-called “meme stocks” that experienced similar retail investor
interest and trading volatility.22
19

Historical price data from Yahoo Finance show GameStop trading at an intraday price
of $3.77 on July 20, 2020, and $483 on January 28, 2021. GameStop Corp. (GME): Historical
Data,
YAHOO!
FIN.
[hereinafter
GameStop
Historical
Data],
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GME/history?period1=1485907200&period2=1643673600
&interval=1d&filter=history&frequency=1d&includeAdjustedClose=true
[https://perma.cc/GFA9-RM9E] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022). GameStop stock split four-forone effective July 21, 2022. Stock Split, GAMESTOP, https://news.gamestop.com/stock-split
(last visited Oct. 25, 2022).
20
Mark DeCambre, GameStop’s Surge Is Making It One of the Most Traded Stocks in the
U.S.,
MARKETWATCH
(Jan.
27,
2021,
12:56
PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/gamestops-stock-surge-is-making-it-one-of-the-mosttraded-in-the-u-s-11611767301.
21
Matthew Fox, GameStop Stock Hit with 6 Trading Halts as Volatility Spike Results in
$176 Daily Trading Range, INSIDER: MKTS. INSIDER (Mar. 10, 2021, 3:28 PM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/gamestop-stock-price-trading-haltsvolatility-spike-176-trading-range-2021-3 [https://perma.cc/GRV4-89G6].
22
A “meme” stock has been described as “a stock, popular with millennial-aged retail
traders, that trades more on hype than its underlying fundamentals.” Thomas Niel, 9 Meme
Stocks that Social Media Won’t Shut Up About, NASDAQ (Feb. 12, 2021, 1:54 PM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/9-meme-stocks-that-social-media-wont-shut-up-about-
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The GameStop story began with GameStop, a Fortune 500 company whose
primary business is the sale of videogames and consumer electronics.23
GameStop was founded in 1996 and conducted its initial public offering in
2002.24 Its shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.25 GameStop’s
business initially focused primarily on the sale of new videogames through its
thousands of retail stores; it subsequently developed a distinctive business model
of buying used videogames from its customers and reselling them.26
Over time, GameStop lost market share to competitors that relied on
digitalized sales of downloadable games. It has failed to earn a profit since
2017.27 GameStop’s poor financial condition was exacerbated when the
COVID-19 lockdown in March 2020 forced it to close its retail stores, many of
which were in empty shopping malls.28 In August 2020, GameStop stock was
trading at around $4/share.29
Retail investor interest in GameStop began with a few small investors,
including Keith Gill. According to his congressional testimony, Gill began to
follow GameStop and to purchase its stock as early as 2019.30 In August 2020,

2021-02-12. Social media platforms often generate the hype behind meme stocks. Id. The
term comes from the word “meme,” which the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines as “an
idea, behavior, style, or usage that spreads from person to person within a culture.” Meme,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme
[https://perma.cc/8E5H-EMFD] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022). Meme stocks are often highly
volatile. See Derek Horstmeyer & Valerie Mayer, Meme Stocks and Systematic Risk,
ENTERPRISING INV. (Aug. 9, 2021), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2021/08/09/memestocks-and-systematic-risk/ [https://perma.cc/L5SR-Q4LS] (describing increased volatility
associated with meme stocks).
23
GAMESTOP, CORPORATE FACT SHEET (2019), https://news.gamestop.com/staticfiles/a07563a1-de5d-43d0-bb11-d6bfd309dacd [https://perma.cc/S4WF-7S27].
24 Id.
25
Id.
26
Abha Bhattarai & Taylor Telford, Despite Record Stock Surge, GameStop Is Still
Struggling to Stay Afloat, WASH. POSt, Feb. 3, 2021, at A22.
27
Id.
28
Shannon Liao, GameStop Closes All Stores, CNN BUS. (Mar. 22, 2020, 9:28 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/20/tech/gamestop-open-essential-business/index.html
[https://perma.cc/FPH2-JQSE] (reporting GameStop’s decision to close all its stores as part
of March 2020 lockdown); Brian Sozzi, GameStop Stores Are Still Empty Despite RedditFueled Trading Frenzy, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/news/gamestop-stores-are-still-empty-despite-redditfueled-trading-frenzy-172939409.html
[https://perma.cc/NF5H-9JYN] (observing that GameStop continued to struggle “with tepid
mall traffic amidst the COVID-19 pandemic”).
29
Matthew Gault & Jason Koebler, How Chaotic Redditors Made GameStop Stock
Skyrocket (and Made Short Sellers Cry), VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 19, 2021, 3:20 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/qjpx8w/how-chaotic-redditors-made-gamestop-stockskyrocket-and-made-short-sellers-cry [https://perma.cc/BF5D-UUCE].
30
Game Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of Keith Patrick Gill, GameStop
Investor).
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Gill posted a YouTube video in which he publicly touted the company’s stock.31
Gill stated in the video that his interest in GameStop was based on several
factors, including a dedicated customer base for its legacy business and its
potential as “an established, uniquely positioned player in a thriving $150 billion
gaming industry . . . . to reinvent itself as a premier gaming hub.”32 In particular,
Gill believed that GameStop could pursue new revenue streams by embracing
the technology-driven digital economy.33
Gill decided to share his enthusiasm for GameStop on social media. In
addition to YouTube, where he went by the name “Roaring Kitty,”34 Gill, using
the name “DeepF***ingValue” or “DFV,” posted his views about GameStop to
a chat forum hosted by Reddit, under the sub-community or subreddit
“WallStreetBets.”35 Participants in WallStreetBets share an interest in stock and
option trading. The r/wallstreetbets page was started in 2012 and gained millions
of new followers during the pandemic lockdown and the related stock market
volatility.36
Gill was not the only investor who viewed GameStop as an attractive
investment. In August 2020, former Chewy co-founder Ryan Cohen publicly
reported that he had purchased 9.6% of GameStop stock.37 Cohen subsequently
approached GameStop management and offered a vision to turn the company
around.38 When his initial private overtures to the company were rebuffed,

31
Keith Gill, 5 Reasons GameStop Stock (GME) Is a Roach Not a Cigar Butt a la Warren
Buffett
&
Could
Short
Squeeze,
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWdWCtLMoU0.
32
Id.
33
Game Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 14 (statement of Keith Patrick Gill, GameStop
Investor) (arguing that “GameStop may be able to find new revenue streams” through its
“unique opportunity to pivot toward a technology-driven business”).
34 Michelle Price, A Year on, GameStop Champion Roaring Kitty Is Quiet¾Yet Much
Richer, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2022, 2:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/technology/yeargamestop-champion-roaring-kitty-is-quiet-yet-much-richer-2022-02-02/.
35
Julia-Ambra Verlaine & Gunjan Banerji, The Man Who Drove GameStop Mania, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 30, 2021, at A1.
36
See Catherine Thorbecke, GameStop Timeline: A Closer Look at the Saga That Upended
Wall
Street,
ABC
NEWS
(Feb.
13,
2021,
6:00
AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/gamestop-timeline-closer-saga-upended-wallstreet/story?id=75617315 [https://perma.cc/W52C-RSZJ] (observing that r/wallstreetbets had
3 million members on January 27, 2021, and more than 8 million by February 3, 2021).
37
See
RC
Ventures
LLC
(Schedule
13D)
(Aug.
31,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001822844/000101359420000673/rc13da1083120.htm [https://perma.cc/3TWW-WC3Y].
38
See Letter from Ryan Cohen, Managing Member, RC Ventures LLC, to GameStop
Board
of
Directors
(Nov.
16,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326380/000101359420000821/rc13da3111620.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UCP-HNXR] (noting RC Ventures’ private outreach to
GameStop’s Board of Directors).
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Cohen sent the GameStop board a public letter calling for a strategic review.39
Cohen’s efforts led the price of GameStop to increase from its August low.40
However, GameStop reported dismal earnings on December 8, 2020, and the
next day its stock price fell to $13.66/share.41
Some commentators anticipated that GameStop, like many other retailers,
would file for bankruptcy because of the pandemic and the lockdown.42 Despite
Cohen’s optimism, several hedge funds were skeptical that his plan would
succeed in turning the company around and took substantial short positions.43
By the end of the year, approximately 140% of GameStop’s public float had
been sold short.44
What followed was a strange combination of events. Gill’s postings excited a
number of retail investors who followed the r/wallstreetbets page, including
many who sought to squeeze the short sellers by purchasing GameStop stock
and driving up the price.45 New investors opened brokerage accounts to invest
in GameStop, and investor interest expanded to other meme stocks, including
AMC, Blackberry, and Nokia (collectively BANG), as well as Koss, Tilray, Bed
Bath & Beyond, and MicroVision.46 These stocks saw their prices rise in
response to interest on social media.47 They also experienced substantial
volatility.48 According to one source, the GameStop frenzy led 28% of U.S.
investors to invest in GameStop or other meme stocks in January 2021.49

39

See id.
See GameStop Historical Data, supra note 19 (documenting rise in GameStop’s trading
price to as high as $17.50/share).
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., Thomas S. Onder, 20 Retailers to Watch for a Bankruptcy Filing in the First
Half of 2021, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/20retailers-to-watch-bankruptcy-filing-first-half-2021
[https://perma.cc/S65K-8QWY]
(including GameStop on list of twenty retailers to watch for bankruptcy filing in first half of
2021).
43
These included Melvin Capital and Citron Capital. Thorbecke, supra note 36.
44
John McCrank, Explainer: How Were More than 100% of GameStop’s Shares Shorted?,
REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2021, 11:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-retail-tradingshortselling-explainer/explainer-how-were-more-than-100-of-gamestops-shares-shortedidUSKBN2AI2DD [https://perma.cc/XW6D-745Y] (reporting that “GameStop’s peak short
interest was 141.8% of its float on Jan. 4[, 2021]”).
45
Philip van Doorn, We Put AMC, GameStop and Other Meme Stocks’ Numbers to the
Test—Here’s Which Ones Came Out on Top, MARKETWATCH (June 8, 2021, 2:02 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/we-put-these-eight-meme-stocks-through-a-ruggedanalytical-test-which-are-poised-for-growth-and-which-have-big-downsides-11622810160.
46
Id.
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
Ethan Wolff-Mann, 28% of Americans Bought GameStop or Other Viral Stocks in
January:
Yahoo
Finance-Harris
Poll,
YAHOO! FIN.
(Feb.
9,
2021),
https://www.yahoo.com/now/gamestop-amc-reddit-investing-213609595.html
[https://perma.cc/H4LU-WSN3].
40
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In January 2021, GameStop announced that it was receptive to Cohen’s plan
and agreed to add him and two other former Chewy executives to its board.50
The combination of Cohen’s activism and the pressure on the short sellers led
GameStop’s price to increase dramatically, and, in turn, those price increases
fueled further purchases.51 Social media posts encouraged investors to buy
GameStop, contributing to the effort to drive prices higher.52 Investor interest
was also spurred by some high-profile tweets, including posts by Elon Musk and
Chamath Palihapitiya.53 GameStop’s relatively small market capitalization and
the high level of short interest exacerbated the volatility of its stock price in
response to these developments.54
App-based trading platforms facilitated retail trading in GameStop.55
Robinhood and Webull were two of the most popular platforms.56 Both were
easy to use, allowed customers to open an account merely by downloading the
app on their phone or mobile device, provided trading on the mobile platform,
required no minimum account balance, and did not charge account fees or
commissions.57 According to CNBC, there were 3.7 million downloads of the
Robinhood App in January 2021.58 In addition to being easy to use, these trading
apps courted investors by offering them free shares of stock for opening accounts

50

Micah Maidenberg, GameStop Adds Cohen to Board, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2021, at B4.
See George Calhoun, GameStop: Were the Short Sellers Routed? Does It Matter?
(Beware
the
‘Gamma’),
FORBES
(Mar.
19,
2021,
4:37
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/03/19/gamestop-were-the-short-sellersrouted-does-it-matter-beware-the-gamma/?sh=4f76a30c4dae (explaining how stock price can
respond to efforts by short sellers to cover their positions).
52
Annabel Smith, The Reddit Revolt: GameStop and the Impact of Social Media on
Institutional Investors, TRADE (Apr. 13, 2021, 9:50 AM), https://www.thetradenews.com/thereddit-revolt-gamestop-and-the-impact-of-social-media-on-institutional-investors/
[https://perma.cc/DYX8-KNMJ] (describing social media’s role in GameStop’s share price
rising over 1,000% in two weeks).
53
Thorbecke, supra note 36; see Elon Musk, @elonmusk, TWITTER (Jan. 26, 2021, 4:08
PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1354174279894642703.
54
Al Root, GameStop Stock Volatility Could Get Even Worse. Here’s Why., BARRON’S
(Feb. 26, 2021, 12:21 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/gamestop-stock-volatilitycould-get-even-worse-heres-why-51614360082.
55
Jennifer J. Schulp, GameStop and the Rise of Retail Trading, 41 CATO J. 511, 514-15
(2021) (discussing rise of retail participation in equity markets and role of trading apps).
56
Other platforms include Dough, Public, and Firsttrade. Nikita Sheth, How to Get Free
Stocks,
FINTY
(Aug.
22,
2022),
https://finty.com/us/investing/free-stocks/
[https://perma.cc/Y8QY-JSDS] (listing app-based brokers and discussing their marketing
tactics).
57
Barbara Friedberg & Benjamin Curry, Webull vs Robinhood: Which Is Better?, FORBES
ADVISOR (Aug. 4, 2022, 11:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/webull-vsrobinhood/ [https://perma.cc/W7WB-SXN7].
58
Maggie Fitzgerald, The GameStop Mania Might Be Over, but Retail Investors Look
Here to Stay, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2021, 9:53 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/13/whyretail-investors-are-here-to-stay.html [https://perma.cc/6PUZ-ZJCR].
51
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or inviting friends to do so59 and by rewarding investors with confetti for actions
like completing their first trade.60 They also reinforced investor interest in
GameStop and other meme stocks by providing investors with lists of popular
and trending stocks.61 The retail boom was not limited to platforms like
Robinhood, however. In 2020, online broker Charles Schwab gained 4 million
new investors, over half of whom were under 40.62 Similarly, Fidelity has
opened 12.7 million new retail customer accounts since March 2020.63 Many
investors opened brokerage accounts in response to the hype on r/wallstreetbets
and looked to social media for guidance on their trading strategies.64
The unprecedented retail trading had systemic implications. On January 28,
2021, several retail trading platforms abruptly restricted transactions in
GameStop and other meme stocks. Robinhood banned new purchases of thirteen
stocks.65 Webull imposed trading restrictions on three stocks.66 TD Ameritrade
announced that it was restricting trading in GameStop and AMC.67 Schwab

59
See Sheth, supra note 56 (describing details of free stock promotions on multiple trading
platforms).
60
See David Ingram, Designed to Distract: Stock App Robinhood Nudges Users to Take
Risks, NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/technews/confetti-push-notifications-stock-app-robinhood-nudges-investors-toward-riskn1053071 [https://perma.cc/MW6L-AUWN] (reporting concerns that Robinhood’s platform
design has “elements of fun” that may encourage users to “develop risky habits that will cost
[them] money over time”).
61
See, e.g., Roberto Stein, The Top 5 Predictable Effects of New Entries in Robinhood’s
“100
Most
Popular”
List
4
(Sept.
17,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3694588
[https://perma.cc/9W5R4XD4] (empirically analyzing effect of inclusion in Robinhood’s “100 most popular” list on
trading behavior of Robinhood users).
62
Stephen McBride, Millennials Will Propel Stocks Higher for Years, FORBES (Feb. 8,
2021, 9:33 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenmcbride1/2021/02/08/millennialswill-propel-stocks-higher-for-years/?sh=56856fff6e5d.
63
Justin Baer, Fidelity, Once Stodgy, Bets on the Reddit Crowd, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2022, at A1.
64
Robinhood, for example, reported that the number of funded accounts increased from
7.2 million in March 2020 to 18 million in March 2021. Adelia Cellini Linecker, Robinhood
IPO to Tap Meme Stocks Crowd as Filing Reveals Soaring Growth, INV.’S BUS. DAILY (July
1, 2021, 4:04 PM), https://www.investors.com/news/robinhood-ipo-to-tap-meme-stockcrowd-huge-share-for-retail-investors/ [https://perma.cc/89EV-NEQX].
65
Brian Barrett, Robinhood Restricts GameStop Trading—In a Bid to Save Itself, WIRED
(Jan. 29, 2021, 6:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/robinhood-gamestop-stock/.
66
James Crowley, Webull Follows Robinhood in Blocking GameStop, AMC Trades After
Being Suggested as Alternate Trading Platform, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2021, 11:52 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/webull-blocks-gamestop-amc-transactions-stock-marketrobinhood-1565172 [https://perma.cc/D4AC-NRSR].
67
Mark DeCambre, GameStop and AMC Trading Restricted by TD Ameritrade, Schwab,
Robinhood
Others,
MARKETWATCH
(Jan.
28,
2021,
10:40
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/gamestop-amc-trading-is-now-being-restricted-at-tdameritrade-11611769804.
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tightened its restrictions on investors’ ability to purchase certain meme stocks
on margin.68 Interactive Brokers Group announced that investors could unwind
but not establish new options positions in five meme stocks.69
Critics of the trading halts argued that the brokers were seeking to protect
hedge fund short sellers from the impact of further price increases.70 The brokers
offered different but varying explanations. Schwab, Webull, and TD
Ameritrade, for example, cited volatility and market instability.71 Robinhood
pointed to dramatically increased capital requirements and costs associated with
clearing the trades.72 Most of the trading restrictions were removed within a
single day.73 Robinhood announced that it had raised more than $1 billion of
new capital to meet the capital requirements.74 Despite their relatively short
duration, the trading halts sparked outrage among investors and led some
lawmakers to call for congressional hearings.75 Dozens of lawsuits were filed
against Robinhood and other companies.76

68

Id.
Id.
70
See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 65 (“Many of Robinhood’s detractors accuse the company
of acting in the interest of institutional short sellers rather than the individual retail investors
that rely on it.”).
71
DeCambre, supra note 67; Crowley, supra note 66.
72
See Game Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 115 (written testimony of Vladimir Tenev,
CEO, Robinhood Markets, Inc.) (“[T]he trading limits we put in place on GameStop and other
stocks were necessary to allow us to continue to meet the clearinghouse deposit requirements
that we pay to support customer trading on our platform.”).
73
Tara Siegel Bernard & Gillian Friedman, After an Outcry, Robinhood Says It Will Allow
Users to Trade GameStop Again on Friday, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/28/business/robinhood-gamestop-restrictions.html
(“Several retail stockbrokers, including Robinhood, said they would allow trades of
GameStop and other volatile companies after restricting customers’ ability to purchase
securities earlier in the day.”).
74
Kate Kelly, Erin Griffith, Andrew Ross Sorkin & Nathaniel Popper, Needing Cash,
Robinhood Raises $1 Billion from Existing Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2021, at B4.
75
Katherine Fung, Alexandria Ocasio Cortez Calls Robinhood’s Block on Trading
GameStop, Other Stocks ‘Unacceptable,’ NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2021, 12:54 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-calls-robinhoods-block-tradinggamestop-other-stocks-unacceptable-1565174 [https://perma.cc/AV6U-M8P4]
(noting Representative Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’s tweet calling Robinhood’s trading halt
“unacceptable”).
76
Amanda Bronstad, Lawsuits over GameStop Trading Expand Beyond Robinhood,
Alleging an Antitrust Conspiracy, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 9, 2021, 10:56 AM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/02/09/lawsuits-over-gamestop-tradingexpand-beyond-robinhood-alleging-an-antitrust-conspiracy/ [https://perma.cc/4UGY-22LN]
(describing forty-two lawsuits against thirty-five defendants including Robinhood). To date,
those lawsuits have not been successful. See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich, Judge Rejects Suit
Against Robinhood, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2022, at B11 (describing dismissal of two lawsuits
against Robinhood arising out of trading halts).
69
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In subsequent months, Ryan Cohen succeeded in becoming chairman of
GameStop and replaced its board of directors and executive team, an effort that
included hiring a new Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) from Amazon.77
Whether the new team will be successful in turning the company around remains
to be seen.78 Although the stock price has not risen to anywhere near its January
2021 high, it has traded near or above $100/share consistently.79
Although interest in meme stocks declined after the winter of 2021, retail
investors have not dropped out of the market.80 As pandemic-related restrictions
are lifted and people return to offices and social interactions, the appeal of appbased stock trading and social media may fade, as will the liquidity provided by
the pandemic stimulus checks. Similarly, the broad market decline in the spring
of 2022 has led to reduced retail trading activity and could cause some new
investors to exit from the markets entirely.81 At the same time, the GameStop
frenzy has left millions of new investors with brokerage accounts, making retail
investor engagement in the capital markets an issue of ongoing concern.82

77
See Sarah E. Needleman, Ryan Cohen’s Power Play at GameStop—36-Year-Old Ousted
Executives in Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2021, at A1 (describing Cohen’s acquisition
of control over GameStop); Svea Herbst-Bayliss, GameStop Lures Amazon Talent with Grand
Plans
and
No
Frills,
REUTERS
(June
11,
2021,
9:43
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/gamestop-lures-amazon-talent-with-grand-plans-nofrills-2021-06-11/ (detailing Cohen’s recruiting of former Amazon Australia chief Matt
Furlong to serve as GameStop’s new CEO).
78
See, e.g., Bernard Zambonin, GameStop Stock: Here’s What You Should Know About
GME’s Bold Turnaround Plan, THESTREET (July 11, 2022, 6:56 AM),
https://www.thestreet.com/memestocks/gme/gamestop-stock-what-you-should-know-boldturnaround-plan [https://perma.cc/2ZSQ-DKFB] (providing update on GameStop’s
turnaround plan after one year under new leadership).
79
GameStop Historical Data, supra note 19.
80
Saqib Iqbal Ahmed, Meme Stock Hangover: A Year After GameStop, Traders Face
Gloomier
Markets,
REUTERS
(Jan.
28,
2022,
12:12
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/meme-stock-hangover-year-after-gamestoptraders-face-gloomier-markets-2022-01-28/.
81
See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Amateur Investors Rode the Bull, but Now the Bear Is
Near, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2022, at B1 (reporting declines in retail trading activity and
describing various retail responses to market decline); Jacob Sonenshine, Retail Investors Are
Dropping Out of the Stock Market, BARRON’S (Mar. 16, 2022, 3:15 AM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/retail-investors-trading-activity-stocks-51647382939
(citing evidence that retail investors may be getting “scared away from the market”).
82
As of October 2021, Robinhood had more than 22 million funded accounts. Robinhood
Reports
Third
Quarter
2021
Results,
ROBINHOOD
(Oct.
26,
2021),
https://investors.robinhood.com/news/news-details/2021/Robinhood-Reports-Third-Quarter2021-Results/ [https://perma.cc/VTH3-R7NV] (noting number of funded accounts increased
97% from 11.4 million in third quarter of 2020).
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Some have called for regulatory intervention.83 Senator Elizabeth Warren
wrote to the SEC demanding that it respond to the GameStop frenzy.84
Commonly voiced concerns include that investors, either individually or
collectively, used social media to manipulate the price of GameStop, and that
Robinhood violated securities laws by temporarily restricting investors from
purchasing GameStop stock.85 The SEC released a request for comment on
digital engagement practices (“DEP”), citing the potential for DEP, including
the gamification of stock trading through brokerage apps, to lead to frequent or
risky trading.86 The SEC also announced that, in light of the GameStop frenzy,
it would review payment for order flow87 and existing rules governing short
selling.88 In addition, the SEC staff released a report on October 14, 2021, stating
that “[t]he extreme volatility in meme stocks in January 2021 tested the capacity
and resiliency of our securities markets in a way that few could have anticipated”
and identifying aspects of the regulatory framework that warranted further
83

See, e.g., James J. Angel, Gamestonk: What Happened and What to Do About It 14, 3436 (Georgetown McDonough Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3782195, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782195 [https://perma.cc/KPY4-SFXW] (advocating reforms to
regulation of short selling and broker dealer compensation practices); Who Wins on Wall
Street?, supra note 8, at 13 (written testimony of Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Professor of Law,
Duke University School of Law) (urging regulators to be “more thoughtful about what
financial products are available to retail investors”); Kyle Langvardt & James Fallows
Tierney, On “Confetti Regulation”: The Wrong Way to Regulate Gamified Investing, 131
YALE L.J.F. 717, 737 (2022) (advocating regulating app-based design features that encourage
excessive trading through concept of “behavioral churning”); see also Ryan Clements,
Misaligned Incentives in Markets: Envisioning Finance that Benefits All of Society, 19
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 60-61 (2021) (citing range of potential regulatory responses to
GameStop frenzy, “including changes to trading halts, increasing capital requirements on
hedge funds, increasing transparency and limiting stock buybacks, consumer protection
measures, and imposing disclosure requirements on social media platforms and forums like
Reddit where sophisticated investors (like hedge funds) can exploit novice investors with the
protection of anonymity”).
84
Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 18.
85
Lucas Manfredi, GameStop’s Big Day as Shares Sit with 1,492% Annual Gain, FOX
BUS. (June 9, 2021, 7:46 AM), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/gamestop-stockmeme-earnings-ryan-cohen-chewy [https://perma.cc/R24J-WXW9].
86
Request for Comment on Digital Engagement Practices, supra note 7, at 49067-69
(“DEPs can potentially harm retail investors if they prompt them to engage in trading
activities that may not be consistent with their investment goals or risk tolerance.”).
87
Dave Michaels, GameStop Saga Prompts SEC to Weigh Review of Payment for Order
Flow, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2021, 2:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-sagaprompts-sec-to-weigh-review-of-payment-for-order-flow-11615316739 (explaining that rise
of commission-free trading has put more focus on controversy surrounding payment for order
flow, “a practice that funnels many small investors’ stock orders to be filled by high-speed
trading firms”).
88
Katanga Johnson, U.S. SEC Chair Says Reviewing Short-Selling, Swap Rules After
GameStop,
Archegos
Sagas,
REUTERS
(May
5,
2021,
2:40
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/us-sec-chief-plans-scrutinize-short-sellers-reingamification-following-gamestop-2021-05-05/.
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study.89 To date, the SEC has not announced any findings of illegal manipulation
or adopted new rules.90
In December 2020, the Massachusetts Attorney General filed an
administrative complaint against Robinhood accusing it of presenting stock
trading as a game and taking advantage of inexperienced investors.91 In April
2021, regulators sought to amend the claim to revoke Robinhood’s registration
as a broker-dealer in Massachusetts.92 In July 2021, Robinhood disclosed
investigations by a variety of other regulators, including the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and the states of New York and California.93
The disclosure followed the announcement that Robinhood had agreed to pay
FINRA a $70 million penalty to settle allegations of wrongdoing.94
Congress held four hearings to investigate the GameStop frenzy: three by the
House Committee on Financial Services and one by the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The first House hearing featured
testimony by Robinhood CEO Vlad Tenev, Keith Gill, and representatives from
Reddit, Citadel, and Melvin Capital.95 The second hearing included testimony

89
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON EQUITY AND OPTIONS MARKET
STRUCTURE CONDITIONS IN EARLY 2021, at 43 (2021) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT],
https://www.sec.gov/files/staff-report-equity-options-market-struction-conditions-early2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCL9-2JPY].
90
SEC Chair Gary Gensler has signaled his intention to update the SEC’s rules to “drive
greater efficiencies in our equity markets, particularly for retail investors.” See Gary Gensler,
Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, “Market Structure and the Retail Investor:” Remarks Before
the
Piper
Sandler
Global
Exchange
Conference
(June
8,
2022),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-remarks-piper-sandler-global-exchangeconference-060822 [https://perma.cc/QF4C-M943].
91
Administrative Complaint at 3, Robinhood Financial, LLC, No. E-2020-0047 (Mass.
Sec. Div. Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/current/sctrobinhood/MSDRobinhood-Financial-LLC-Complaint-E-2020-0047.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5J-7RFY]
(“Robinhood used advertising and marketing techniques that targeted younger individuals,
including Massachusetts residents, with little, if any, investment experience.”).
92
Nate Raymond, Massachusetts Regulators Seek to Revoke Robinhood’s License;
Brokerage
Sues,
REUTERS
(Apr.
15,
2021,
2:13
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/robinhood-sues-invalidate-massachusetts-fiduciaryrule-2021-04-15/; Motion for Leave to File Amended Administrative Complaint at 1-2,
Robinhood Financial, LLC, No. E-2020-0047 (Mass. Sec. Div. Apr. 15, 2021),
https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20210415/04142021robinhood_amend.p
df [https://perma.cc/232A-CSLR] (arguing that Robinhood’s failure to change its behavior
since initial filing is grounds for revocation of registration as broker-dealer in Massachusetts).
93
Chris Prentice & Michelle Price, Explainer: The Regulatory and Legal Headwinds
Facing
Robinhood,
REUTERS
(July
2,
2021,
6:28
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/regulatory-legal-headwinds-facing-robinhood-202107-02/.
94
Id.
95
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Jason Karaian, Michael J. de la Merced, Lauren Hirsch & Ephrat
Livni, “Something Very Wrong Happened Here,” N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/business/dealbook/robinhood-hearing-congress.html.
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by academics and other experts.96 SEC Chair Gary Gensler, CEO of the
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Michael C. Bodson, and FINRA CEO
Robert Cook testified at the third hearing.97 Finally, the Senate hearing featured
various researchers on capital markets.98 At the hearings, members of Congress
and witnesses explored various potential concerns raised by the GameStop
frenzy and debated a range of potential regulatory responses.99
II.

ADDRESSING THE GAMESTOP FRENZY

Commentators have identified two distinct sets of regulatory concerns arising
out of the GameStop frenzy. One set focuses on investor protection. Based on
the premise that retail investors, particularly those who participated in the
frenzy, are vulnerable, the concerns cite the potential that others, including other
investors, social media platforms, and brokerage firms, could exploit that
vulnerability.100 The core theme is a need to protect retail investors from the
market.101
A separate set of concerns focuses on the market impact of the GameStop
frenzy rather than the impact on individual market participants.102 These
96
Matt Phillips, Congress Hears Testimony Again on GameStop, Focusing on the
Financial Plumbing Behind the Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/business/gamestop-hearing.html.
97
Game Stopped? Part III, supra note 8, at 5-6, 8.
98
Who Wins on Wall Street?, supra note 8, at 6-14.
99
See, e.g., Cora Leeuwenburg, An Update on the Gamestop Frenzy: Calls for Regulation
and a Congressional Hearing, LOY. UNIV. CHI. SCH. OF L.: INSIDE COMPLIANCE (Mar. 19,
2021), http://blogs.luc.edu/compliance/?p=3770 [https://perma.cc/7U6L-MFVV] (describing
regulatory changes proposed during Senate hearing).
100
See, e.g., Bob Pisani, Wall Street Worries About Regulatory Fallout from the GameStop
Saga, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2021, 10:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/04/wall-streetworries-about-regulatory-fallout-from-the-gamestop-saga.html
[https://perma.cc/5ELNKRP6] (describing concerns expressed by FINRA that “gamification may have caused
investors to trade excessively or make investments not suitable for them”).
101
As Abe Cable explains, the concept of investor protection encompasses three distinct
rationales¾paternalistic investor protection, protection of investor choice, and protection of
investor access. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Regulating Democratized Investing, OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
8-10),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4136828
[https://perma.cc/2RQ8GN83]. Calls for regulatory reform in response to the GameStop frenzy are driven largely by
paternalistic concerns and, as Cable explains, are likely to sacrifice investor choice and access.
Id. (manuscript at 29, 33-34).
102
See, e.g., Kevin Stankiewicz, Massachusetts Regulator Says GameStop Speculation Is
a Danger to the Whole Market, as TD Ameritrade Restricts Trading, CNBC (Jan. 27, 2021,
4:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/27/gamestop-speculation-is-danger-to-wholemarket-massachusetts-regulator.html [https://perma.cc/X5XU-EM2W] (describing statement
by Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Galvin that GameStop frenzy
“presents a broader threat to the U.S. equity market”); David Randall, Analysis: A Tulip by
Another Name? “Gamestonk” and the Case for Investor Caution, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2021,
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concerns are motivated less by paternalism than the prospect that price
irrationality, volatility, and heavy trading volume have systemic consequences.
As a result, these commentators seek to protect the market from retail investors.
This Part considers and evaluates both sets of concerns.
A.

Protecting Retail Investors from the Market

Commentators have written extensively about the retail investors who were
caught up in the “meme” stock trading frenzy. As the articles note, a substantial
number were inexperienced investors for whom the investment in GameStop
and perhaps other meme stocks was their first venture into the capital markets.103
The investors who use Robinhood and other app-based trading platforms such
as Webull tend to be younger and to hold fewer assets than traditional retail
investors.104 They also tend to be small investors. For example, the median
account size at Robinhood is $240.105 Survey evidence suggests that new traders
are overly optimistic about the likelihood that they will make money through
their trading.106
Critics warn that these investors are likely to lose money¾money they cannot
afford to lose.107 As one commentator put it, “fledgling investors, many of whom
started trading on free trading apps like Robinhood during the pandemic, might
not understand the intricacies of what is happening, leading to some incredibly
risky bets with money they can’t afford to lose.”108 Another observed that “for
7:16
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-retail-trading-bubbles-analysisidUSKBN29Z0HG (quoting Boston College finance professor Ronnie Sadka’s statement that
“[r]etail investors are becoming a systemic risk”).
103
See, e.g., Katie Martin & Robin Wigglesworth, Rise of the Retail Army: The Amateur
Traders
Transforming
Markets,
FIN.
TIMES
(Mar.
9,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/7a91e3ea-b9ec-4611-9a03-a8dd3b8bddb5
[https://perma.cc/DN3L-5NBV] (“A Deutsche Bank survey found that almost half of US
retail investors were completely new to the markets in the past year.”).
104
See id.; Nathaniel Popper, Robinhood Has Lured Young Traders, Sometimes with
Devastating Results, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2021, at B1 (noting that average age of Robinhood
investors is thirty-one and half of Robinhood investors have never invested before).
105
Keris Lahiff, Robinhood Debuts on Nasdaq—Jim Cramer and Others Share Their
Take,
CNBC:
TRADING
NATION
(July
29,
2021,
5:42
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/29/robinhood-stock-nasdaq-ipo-jim-cramer-and-othersshare-their-take.html [https://perma.cc/CU96-V485].
106
The Rise of the Investor Generation: 15% of U.S. Stock Market Investors Got Their
Start
in
2020,
Schwab
Study
Shows,
CHARLES
SCHWAB
CORP.,
https://www.aboutschwab.com/generation-investor-study-2021
[https://perma.cc/K4A3NAWY] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) (reporting results of 2021 survey showing those who
began investing in 2020 are more optimistic about stock market).
107
See Popper, supra note 104 (observing that inexperience of Robinhood traders can lead
to “staggering losses”).
108
Alicia Adamczyk, “You Will Lose Your Money Very, Very Quickly”: What Investors
Need to Know About GameStop’s Stock Surge, CNBC: MAKE IT (Jan. 27, 2021, 5:28 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/27/what-to-know-about-gamestops-stock-spike.html
[https://perma.cc/TC28-9F7B].
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many [investors] who are younger and less experienced, meme investing
ratchets the old idea of a stock tip up to a whole new level of virality and
financial risk.”109
The potential vulnerability of meme investors is increased by the mechanisms
by which they are trading. Some of these new investors engage in substantial
margin trading—trading with borrowed funds rather than using cash deposited
in their accounts.110 The allure of app-based trading and the hype associated with
meme stocks may cause retail investors both to trade excessively and to incur
excessive debt. Margin trading increases the risk associated with trades both by
increasing investors’ exposure to the market and by creating the potential for
investors to lose more than they can afford.111 As former TD Ameritrade CEO
Joe Moglia explained, “leverage . . . can rip your arms off.”112 Indeed, data
indicate that Robinhood customers were fourteen times more likely to default on
their margin loans than the average investor.113 Although the Federal Reserve
limits the percentage of a securities purchase that can be financed through
borrowing,114 investors sometimes seek to circumvent these limits by using
personal loans or credit card debt.115 In addition, investors who purchase on
109
Rizwan Virk, GameStop Trades and Meme Investing Turn Stocks into a Pump-andDump
Scheme,
NBC
NEWS:
THINK
(Feb.
19,
2021,
5:20
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/gamestop-trades-meme-investing-make-stocksponzi-scheme-hurts-little-ncna1257680 [https://perma.cc/2GHT-E3MN].
110
Simon Constable, Massive Margin Call Strikes Again in the Stock Market, FORBES
(Mar.
29,
2021,
11:52
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2021/03/29/massive-leverage-strikes-againin-the-stock-market/?sh=566f6c2a147f (“An army of individual investors used borrowed
money to pile into the stock sending shares in the struggling company skyrocketing.”).
111
See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Understanding Margin Accounts, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N
(June
10,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-andbulletins/ib_marginaccount [https://perma.cc/7FU9-983Y] (explaining that margin trading
“exposes you to the potential for larger losses”).
112
Carla Mozée, Leverage “Can Rip Your Arms Off,” Former TD Ameritrade Boss Says
in Warning to Meme-Stock Retail Traders, INSIDER: MKTS. INSIDER (June 4, 2021, 8:48 AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/meme-stock-leverage-warning-ex-tdameritrade-boss-amc-reddit-2021-6 [https://perma.cc/2DPY-QVNQ].
113
Stephen Gandel, Robinhood Offers Loans to Buy Stock—They Were 14 Times More
Likely
to
Default,
CBS
NEWS
(Feb.
5,
2021,
6:09
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/robinhood-stock-loans-were-14-times-more-likely-todefault-than-rivals/ [https://perma.cc/JF9Q-SAKY]. One possible explanation is that
Robinhood was more aggressive in enabling its customers to borrow because of the interest
that it earned on those margin loans. See id. (describing stock lending as “one of Robinhood’s
few profit centers”).
114
See Investor Bulletin: Understanding Margin Accounts, supra note 111 (“According to
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board, you may borrow up to 50 percent of the purchase
price of margin securities.”).
115
Lance Roberts, This Won’t End Well—Gen Z’ers Take on Debt to Invest, ADVISOR
PERSPS.
(Sept.
3,
2021),
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margin bear the risk of a margin call, which, if the customer lacks the cash to
meet, could result in the broker automatically selling the customer’s stock.116
Options further increase investor risk. Options provide an alternative way to
increase investor buying power and were cited as a substantial factor boosting
the demand for GameStop stock.117 Inexperienced traders are unlikely to
understand how options work, however, or to evaluate the risk associated with
their positions accurately. Although the brokerage industry imposes safeguards
designed to limit the use of options by inexperienced investors, Robinhood has
been criticized for failing to deploy these safeguards effectively and for allowing
inexperienced investors to access margin loans and options too easily.118 One
Robinhood investor, a 20-year-old student, committed suicide after his options
trading through his Robinhood account led him to incorrectly believe he had a
negative $730,000 account balance.119
A related concern is that retail customers are not really investing in meme
stocks but are instead gambling.120 To many critics, purchases of meme stocks
appear irrational and untethered to fundamentals. Traders may be seduced by a
combination of the trading apps they use and the social media platforms from
which they obtain their trading information. Terming the apps on which these
investors trade “gamified” and “addictive,” commentators chastise the platforms

https://www.advisorperspectives.com/commentaries/2021/09/03/this-wont-end-well-genzers-take-on-debt-to-invest [https://perma.cc/V23T-DGSV] (reporting that many individual
investors “took out personal loans or went into credit card debt” to fund their stock purchases).
116
Mozée, supra note 112.
117
David Borun, How Options Trading Is Fueling the GameStop Rally, NASDAQ (Jan. 26,
2021, 4:50 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/how-options-trading-is-fueling-thegamestop-rally-2021-01-26 (explaining how use of options increased GameStop demand and
volatility).
118
See News Release, Michelle Ong, Ray Pellecchia, Angelita Plemmer Williams &
Andrew DeSouza, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., FINRA Orders Record Financial Penalties
Against Robinhood Financial LLC (June 30, 2021), https://www.finra.org/mediacenter/newsreleases/2021/finra-orders-record-financial-penalties-against-robinhoodfinancial [https://perma.cc/Z54J-SJTJ] (stating that Robinhood “failed to exercise due
diligence before approving customers to place options trades”).
119
Sarah Jackson, Robinhood Has Settled a Lawsuit over the Death of a 20-Year-Old Who
Died by Suicide Last Year Thinking He Lost $730,000 on the Stock-Trading App, INSIDER
(July 1, 2021, 5:59 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/robinhood-settled-suit-suicide-20year-old-trader-alex-kearns-2021-7 [https://perma.cc/5C85-SSJL]. Robinhood settled a
wrongful death lawsuit over the suicide for an undisclosed amount. Id.
120
See, e.g., Virk, supra note 109 (“[M]ost of the people putting money into the next big
thing aren’t really investing; they are truly just gambling online.”); Madison Darbyshire,
Traders Phone up Gambling Helplines as Game-Like Broker Apps Spread, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
6,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/8f9bbc77-06b1-4fbd-8b7e-6e381ba038a7
[https://perma.cc/D37S-ADC2] (quoting statement of Keith Whyte, executive director of
National Council on Problem Gambling, that “line between gambling and investing, which
was already pretty fluid, has almost been completely erased”).
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for pushing investors into inappropriate trading decisions.121 Trading platforms
also increase herding by investors.122 Sites such as Robinhood publish lists of
stocks that are popular among their customers and push this information on the
app.123 Studies show that the inclusion of a stock on the list substantially
increases customer trading of the stock.124
Critics also challenge brokerage firms’ conflicts of interest, observing that the
business models of Robinhood and the other app-based brokers rely on trading
to generate income.125 Of particular concern is the fact that some trading apps
earn a substantial amount of revenue from payment for order flow.126 Payment
for order flow occurs when brokers route their customer orders to wholesalers
for execution rather than directly to an exchange. In turn, wholesalers pay the
brokerage rebates in exchange for those orders.127 In theory, the rebate does not
increase the cost of the trade to the customer, whose order must be executed at
the best price available.128 In reality, however, it is possible to generate price
improvement for a customer in connection with a trade, and payment for order

121
See Darbyshire, supra note 120 (quoting North American Securities Administrators
Association as saying, “[b]y using features such as confetti, scratch-off style graphics and
awards systems, certain firms are encouraging investors to make trades that may not be in
their best interests and would conversely serve the interests of the broker-dealer”).
122
See, e.g., Brad M. Barber, Xing Huang, Terrance Odean & Christopher Schwarz,
Attention-Induced Trading and Returns: Evidence from Robinhood Users, J. FIN.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 28-29), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3715077
[https://perma.cc/JZ8D-CN9Z] (reporting that Robinhood focuses investor attention on
certain stocks, encouraging herding and leading to lower investment returns).
123
See Stein, supra note 61 (describing Robinhood’s top 100 list).
124
Id. (reporting that customers were five to seven times more likely to buy stocks newly
named to top 100 list).
125
See, e.g., Mark Schoeff Jr. & Nicole Casperson, GameStop’s Saga: What the Stock
Surge Proves About Financial (Il)literacy, INV. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.investmentnews.com/gamestops-saga-what-the-stock-surge-proves-aboutfinancial-literacy-205019 [https://perma.cc/9W8V-HZ4F] (quoting William Galvin,
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as saying, “Gamification strategies in the
Robinhood app—like sending daily push notifications or displaying confetti raining down
after each trade—are used to ‘lure customers’ into consistent participation and long-term
engagement with the platform, which, in turn, generates more revenue for the app”).
126
See Avi Salzman, SEC Chairman Says Banning Payment for Order Flow Is “On the
Table,” BARRON’S (Aug. 30, 2021, 4:46 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/secchairman-says-banning-payment-for-order-is-on-the-table-51630350595?mod=hp_LEAD_2
(reporting SEC Chair Gary Gensler’s statement that banning payment for order flow is “on
the table”).
127
Id.
128
The requirement of best execution is somewhat lax. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III,
Modernizing Odd Lot Trading, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 520, 525 (providing data
demonstrating that odd lot trading rules reduce impact of best execution requirement for
popular retail stocks on nonexchange trading venues).
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flow generally results in the broker, rather than the customer, receiving the
benefit of any potential price improvement.129
Although payment for order flow has been around since the 1980s, it appears
that Robinhood is the first trading platform to receive virtually all of its revenue
from this source.130 Robinhood earned an average of two-tenths of a penny for
each share bought or sold.131 Payment for order flow can create an incentive for
a broker to encourage its customers to engage in more trading than is appropriate
for their investment objectives, a process that Kyle Langvardt and James Fallows
Tierney term “behavioral churning.”132 As SEC staff noted, payment for order
flow “can create a conflict of interest for the retail broker-dealer” and that
“payment for order flow and the incentives it creates may cause broker-dealers
to find novel ways to increase customer trading, including through the use of
digital engagement practices.”133
Critics also raise concerns about the extent to which meme investors are
influenced by social media.134 Many investors opened brokerage accounts in
response to the hype in the Reddit community known as WallStreetBets and then
looked to social media (rather than trained investment professionals) for
guidance on their trading strategies.135 In particular, commentators warn that
investors may simply be following a social trend rather than investing based on

129
See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Off-Exchange Market Makers and Their Best Execution
Obligations: An Evolving Mixture of Market Reform, Regulatory Enforcement, and
Litigation, 17 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 477, 512 (2021) (“Robinhood explicitly offered to accept
less price improvement for its customers than what the principal trading firms were offering,
in exchange for receiving a higher rate of payment for order flow for itself.”).
130
John McCrank, Explainer: Robinhood Makes Most of Its Money from PFOF. What Is
It?,
REUTERS
(July
29,
2021,
11:59
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/robinhood-makes-most-its-money-pfof-what-isit-2021-07-29/.
131
Tomio Geron, Data Shows How Robinhood Makes More Money from Its Users than
Other Brokers, PROTOCOL (July 15, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/fintech/payment-fororder-flow [https://perma.cc/NP6G-HZY8].
132
Langvardt & Fallows Tierney, supra note 83, at 737.
133
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 89, at 12, 44.
134
See, e.g., Sue S. Guan, Meme Investors and Retail Risk, 63 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 11-12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4002708
[https://perma.cc/K5A8-L6T9].
135
Thinking About Investing in the Latest Hot Stock? Understand the Significant Risks of
Short-Term Trading Based on Social Media, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N: INV. ALERTS BULL.
(Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/risks-short-termtrading-based-social-media-investor-alert [https://perma.cc/2BMA-HXKU]. One study
empirically demonstrated that Reddit posts led to increased trading in GameStop shares.
André Betzer & Jan Philipp Harries, How Online Discussion Board Activity Affects Stock
Trading: The Case of GameStop, FIN. MKTS. & PORTFOLIO MGMT. (Mar. 30, 2022),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11408-022-00407-w.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SJ32-FPQS].
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sound investment analysis.136 The anonymity of these platforms also increases
the potential for misinformation and even manipulation.137 As the Washington
Post observed: “With Reddit users cloaked in anonymity, there is no way of
knowing whether messages touting GameStop come from average Joes—or
scam artists executing a ‘pump-and-dump’ stock scheme.”138
Finally, as this Article goes to press, the capital markets have suffered a
substantial decline, with stocks falling more than 20 percent since the start of
2022.139 As a result, many retail investors who began investing during 2021 have
suffered significant losses.140
B.

Protecting the Market from Retail Investors

The GameStop frenzy has also caused commentators to worry about the
broader capital market impact of retail investing. Three related concerns
dominate: volatility, systemic instability, and capital allocation.
As noted above, the price of GameStop and other meme stocks has been
highly volatile. In a single day, GameStop’s price swings led to six trading
halts.141 The level of short selling, coupled with the use of margin trading and
options to leverage demand, fueled these price swings.142
Volatility can exacerbate trading losses and generate higher levels of
uninformed trading. It can also stress market mechanisms for pricing and
clearing trades, lead to increased margin calls, and generate shortages in
liquidity. The GameStop frenzy illustrated several of these concerns. The
volatility of GameStop’s price created pressure on the outstanding short
positions, forcing short sellers to purchase stock, often at inflated prices, to cover
mounting losses. Trading volatility led to concern by clearinghouses about the
potential for failed trades, particularly when the trades were executed on margin.
136

See, e.g., Reethu Ravi, How Social Media Is Causing a Meme Stock Mania, JUMPSTART
(May 26, 2021), https://www.jumpstartmag.com/how-social-media-is-causing-a-memestock-mania/ [https://perma.cc/B4EK-68HB] (“[M]eme stock investing often follow [sic] a
social media trend rather than logical reasoning.”).
137
See, e.g., Brian O’Connell, The Rise of Meme Stocks: How Viral Trading Hit High Gear
in
Early
2021,
FINMASTERS,
https://finmasters.com/the-rise-of-meme-stocks/
[https://perma.cc/VG3R-9RH2] (last updated Aug. 9, 2022) (quoting Asher Rogovy, Chief
Investment Officer at Magnifina, as saying, “Fraudsters may be emboldened to make false
claims on anonymous internet forums”).
138
David J. Lynch, Hamza Shaban, Hannah Denham & Tory Newmyer, Unlikely Shares
Surge in Wall Street Revolt, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2021, at A1.
139
Conrad de Aenlle, Recession Worries and Bear Markets, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2022, at
BU7.
140
See, e.g., Lu Wang, Day Trader Army Loses All the Money It Made in Meme-Stock Era,
BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2022, 5:55 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-0508/day-trader-army-loses-all-the-money-it-made-in-meme-stock-era#xj4y7vzkg
(citing
Morgan Stanley estimate finding “amateur investors who jumped in when the [COVID-19]
lockdown began have now given back all of their once-prodigious gains”).
141
Fox, supra note 21.
142
See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 89, at 17-22.
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This, in turn, led those clearinghouses to demand higher deposits from retail
brokerage firms such as Robinhood, which caused many such firms temporarily
to halt trading in meme stocks.143
One reason for these deposit requirements was the risk that failed trades
impose on the system. If retail customers cannot pay for their trades, those losses
may be passed on to brokerage firms and, in turn, affect the financial stability of
counterparties to those trades or market intermediaries.144 In the past, large
losses suffered by a customer have had potentially significant market-wide
impacts, as in the case of Long Term Capital Management.145 The more recent
Archegos case, in which a single family office’s inability to meet margin calls
triggered a $20 billion sell off in the market raised, similar concerns.146
Although the GameStop frenzy does not appear to have had an impact on
broader market stability,147 commentators view retail trading as presenting a
similar potential for systemic risk. Congressman Stephen Lynch warned of retail
trading’s potential to fuel systemic risk.148 Similarly, Senator Elizabeth Warren
noted that the GameStop frenzy and the level of speculation it involved could
prompt broader market sell-offs.149 She observed that the resulting market shift
“also raises questions about broader instabilities in the market and financial
system.”150

143

See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 89, at 31 (“[I]n highly volatile trading where share
prices whipsaw by hundreds of dollars, NSCC may require more margin to guard against an
increased risk of defaults.”).
145
See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE
LESSONS
OF
LONG-TERM
CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT
17-19
(1999),
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/fcic-docs/1999-0400%20Hedge%20Funds,%20Leverage,%20and%20the%20Lessons%20of%20LongTerm%20Capital%20Management%20(PWG%20on%20Financial%20Markets).pdf
[https://perma.cc/VNU2-4KSW] (describing potential market effect on counterparties if
LTCM had failed).
146
Will Daniel, Retail Trading Was Said to Be a Risk to Markets During the GameStop
Saga, but the Archegos Blowup Has Reddit Users Pointing Fingers Back at Wall Street,
INSIDER:
MKTS.
INSIDER
(Mar.
30,
2021,
7:56
AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/reddit-retail-traders-systemic-risk-hedgefund-archegos-liquidation-2021-3 [https://perma.cc/WW96-9UUS].
147
See Matt Phillips, Matthew Goldstein & Ephrat Livni, S.E.C. Suggests No Policy
Changes in Response to Meme Stock Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2021, at B4 (stating SEC
staff “found that everything worked largely the way it was supposed to”).
148
See Daniel, supra note 146.
149
Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 18.
150
Id.
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Retail trading may also reduce liquidity,151 which can raise transaction costs
and reduce market efficiency.152 Sue Guan demonstrates how coordinated retail
trading could reduce liquidity by leading to wider spreads by liquidity suppliers
and other market participants.153
The influx of retail market participants whose activities might be described as
speculation rather than investing generates additional problems. Commentators
warn that retail traders are “treating the stock market like a casino.”154 Market
speculation both disrupts the link between prices and fundamental value155 and
reduces investor confidence. To the extent that prices are distorted, they affect
issuers’ costs of capital, enabling companies that do not have significant
productive capacity to raise money more easily and raising the cost of capital for
sound companies. AMC, for example, raised $1 billion in capital while its stock
price was buoyed by the meme stock boom, and GameStop raised $1.7
million.156 Notably, in its prospectus, AMC cautioned investors that its current
stock price reflected market dynamics unrelated to the company’s fundamental
value, stating that “we caution you against investing in our Class A common
stock, unless you are prepared to incur the risk of losing all or a substantial
portion of your investment.”157
As one commentator observed, “The capital markets exist to fund companies,
create jobs, and drive our economy, while also helping millions of American
families save for retirement, college, or to buy homes.”158 Another reasoned,

151
Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock Market
Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 84 (2018) (“Liquidity is a
multidimensional concept that relates to the size of a trade, the price at which it is
accomplished, and the time it takes to accomplish the trade.”).
152
See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices,
41 Duke L.J. 977, 1019 (1992) (describing costs resulting from reduced liquidity).
153
Guan, supra note 134 (manuscript at 28).
154
Letter from Elizabeth Warren, supra note 18.
155
See Alexander Kurov, Wall Street Isn’t Just a Casino Where Traders Can Bet on
GameStop and Other Stocks—It’s Essential to Keeping Capitalism from Crashing,
CONVERSATION (Feb. 4, 2021, 6:46 PM), https://theconversation.com/wall-street-isnt-just-acasino-where-traders-can-bet-on-gamestop-and-other-stocks-its-essential-to-keepingcapitalism-from-crashing-154154 [https://perma.cc/EG9N-QLP2].
156
Carleton English, Taking Stock of Meme Mania Taking Stock of Meme Mania¾One
Year After It Started, the Reddit-Fueled Trading Boom Is Fizzling. Our Reporter Looks for
Answers, BARRON’S, Jan. 31, 2022, at 26.
157
AMC Ent. Holdings, Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5) (June 3, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001411579/000110465921076090/tm21183731_424b5.htm [https://perma.cc/CU8U-P6BZ].
158
Letter from Tyler Gellasch, Exec. Dir., Healthy Mkts., to Maxine Waters, Chairwoman,
House Comm. on Fin. Servs.; Patrick McHenry, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Fin.
Servs.; Brad Sherman, Chairman, House Comm. on Fin. Servs.; Bill Huizenga, Ranking
Member, House Comm. on Fin. Servs. 1 (Feb. 17, 2021), https://healthymarkets.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Letter-to-HFSC-Hearing-2-17-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SF9ANMZH].
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Essential to the success of the markets is the notion that they are efficient,
they reflect the allocation of capital to the most productive uses. Dramatic
swings in share price, untethered from any rigorous economic analysis, and
motivated by internet mob mentality, destroys this notion.159
III. EVALUATING THE NEED FOR REFORM
The foregoing concerns about the GameStop frenzy are legitimate. Many
investors lost money, including some who lost more than they could afford to
lose.160 The price of GameStop stock fluctuated wildly, and the social mediafueled speculation spread to other companies. Social media-fueled trading sites
present particular risks of fraud and manipulation, and app-based trading
platforms challenge both existing broker-dealer practices and the manner in
which those practices are regulated.
The link between these concerns and broadscale regulatory reform is,
however, less compelling. While it is true that people can lose money through
misguided stock purchases, people lose money in a variety of ways: by
gambling, spending too much on a trendy fashion item, or incurring costly credit
card debt. Although regulation seeks both to inform people about the
consequences of these choices and to limit opportunism, a fundamental
component of a free society is that people can make choices with which others
might disagree. Regulating with the objective of preventing unwise investing
decisions is paternalism.
Paternalism seems particularly misplaced with respect to investments that,
like the meme stocks involved here, were publicly traded securities listed on
national securities exchanges.161 The extensive and expansive body of federal
regulation was specifically designed to enable retail investors to purchase
publicly traded securities and to protect them when doing so. Federal securities
regulation is premised on the idea, however, that providing investors and the
capital markets with full information is a more desirable regulatory approach

159
Eric Wright, Should the Game Stop with Gamestop, COLO. TECH. L.J.: BLOG (Feb. 2,
2021), https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=748 [https://perma.cc/3LM5-FA6L].
160
See Bailey Lipschultz, Bed Bath & Beyond Tumble Shows Risks of Chasing Meme
Stocks,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
30,
2021,
4:09
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-30/bed-bath-beyond-tumble-shows-therisks-of-chasing-meme-stocks (observing many meme stocks have suffered substantial price
declines since January 2021).
161
For that reason, this Article focuses on meme stocks, and does not consider the extent
to which its analysis extends to other financial instruments such as cryptocurrency or
nonfungible tokens, which are not subject to the same regulatory scheme. See David YaffeBellany, Erin Griffith & Ephrat Livni, As Cryptocurrencies Melt Down, $300 Billion
Evaporates in Days, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2022, at A1 (reporting $300 billion losses in
“experimental and unregulated digital currencies”).
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than having the federal government screen potential investment opportunities
for safety or quality.162
Additionally, the magnitude of harm to most individual investors associated
with meme trading is quite small. A February 2021 poll found that, although
28% of survey respondents reported buying at least one meme stock, the median
amount they invested was only $150.163 Most investors did not buy stock on
margin or to trade in options.164 Of those who traded options, most used simple
call options which enabled them to put down a smaller amount of money and
profit if stock prices increased.165 If stock prices fell, investors would simply
lose the cost of the option. Significantly, investor losses were likely on the order
of what they might have lost on a prepandemic trip to Las Vegas or Atlantic
City.
Although meme trading might lead some to argue that retail investors are
better off delegating their investment decisions to trained professionals,166
commentators have long recognized that investing through intermediaries has
flaws as well.167 These include the sometimes significant fees charged by those
intermediaries, problematic sales practices, conflicts of interest, and simple
incompetence—incompetence that retail investors may be poorly positioned to

162
As Louis Brandeis put it, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
163
Wolff-Mann, supra note 49.
164
See, e.g., Game Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 116 (written testimony of Vladimir
Tenev, CEO, Robinhood Markets, Inc.) (stating as of end of 2020, only “about 13 percent of
Robinhood customers traded basic options contracts (e.g., puts and calls), and only about two
percent traded multi-leg options. Less than three percent of funded accounts were marginenabled”).
165
See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 89, at 42 (reporting that increased GameStop option
trading “concentrated heavily in call options, a large percentage of which were short-dated”);
Thyagaraju Adinarayan, Retail Trading Fever Drives U.S. Equity Option Volumes to Record
Monthly High, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2021, 11:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-retailtrading-options/retail-trading-fever-drives-u-s-equity-option-volumes-to-record-monthlyhigh-idUSKBN2A322R (observing that retail trading volume concentrated in call options,
which allowed investors to risk less money).
166
See Jay Clayton, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Evolving Market for Retail
Investment Services and Forward-Looking Regulation—Adding Clarity and Investor
Protection
While
Ensuring
Access
and
Choice
(May
2,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-2018-05-02
[https://perma.cc/JP45JAKY] (“Markets can be intimidating and complex . . . . It is an investment professional’s job
to bridge this knowledge, information, and comfort gap.”).
167
For a particularly colorful description of the extent to which securities firms have taken
advantage of their retail customers, see Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some
Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1428-29
(2002).
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identify.168 There is also a curious sense of elitism reflected in the commentary.
Only a small percentage of retail investors own stock directly,169 and that stock
ownership is concentrated in rich white men.170 For some, the prospect that appbased trading opens the capital markets to investors outside that narrow sphere
suggests that something is wrong. But as SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce
observes, “telling investors they cannot make decisions for themselves only
supports their suspicions that the capital markets are for the wealthy.”171
The criticisms that have been leveled at app-based trading platforms like
Robinhood’s for gamifying stock trading are also problematic. As noted above,
the SEC requested public comment on digital engagement practices, observing
that game-like features and other design elements of the apps “may encourage
investors to trade more often, invest in different products, or change their
investment strategy.”172 The Massachusetts Attorney General brought an
enforcement action against Robinhood for bringing gamification to investing.173
Essentially, the complaint alleged that Robinhood’s app, through features such
as displaying confetti after a customer traded, made investing in the stock market
entertaining for young investors in an effort to generate greater engagement.174

168

See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Broker-Dealer Investment
Recommendations—Laying the Groundwork for the Next Financial Crisis, 13 DREXEL L. REV.
377, 383-96 (2021) (describing problematic broker dealer practices and regulatory efforts to
combat those practices); Fisch, Securities Intermediaries, supra note 1, at 2000-02 (describing
abusive mutual fund sales practices by brokers); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS
OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS
26 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CP3H-DKLH] (stating that conflicted retirement advisors cost Americans
$17 billion per year).
169
Ben Soppitt, The Gamification of Investing Brings Opportunity—and Risks, FORBES
(Jan.
8,
2021,
7:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/01/08/the-gamification-ofinvesting-brings-opportunity--and-risks/ (“[I]nvesting has historically been the preserve of a
small but wealthy minority, with normal consumers excluded through a mixture of cost and
lack of information, awareness and access due to the archaic nature of traditional investment
methods.”).
170
Tim Smart, Who Owns Stocks in America? Mostly, It’s the Wealthy and White, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 15, 2021, 10:58 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/nationalnews/articles/2021-03-15/who-owns-stocks-in-america-mostly-its-the-wealthy-and-white.
171
Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Investor Advisory
Committee Meeting (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peircestatement-investor-advisory-committee-meeting-031121 [https://perma.cc/Z5R9-NQB7].
172
Gary Gensler, Statement on Request for Information and Comments on Broker-Dealer
and Investment Advisor Digital Engagement Practices, Related Tools and Methods, and
Regulatory Considerations and Potential Approaches, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 27,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/gensler-dep-request-comment
[https://perma.cc/H2CZ-QACJ]; see Request for Comment on Digital Engagement Practices,
supra note 7, at 49067-69.
173
See Administrative Complaint, supra note 91, at 1.
174
Id. at 3.
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Better Markets describes the app as “incorporating addictive, endorphinengendering game features.”175 Similarly, Healthy Markets argued to Congress
that regulators should regulate the use of confetti and other “game-like features”
in trading apps.176
It is unclear, however, why investing should not be fun. Gaming has become
an increasing part of everyday life, and gamification has been used to promote
user engagement across a variety of areas, including healthcare, education, and
banking.177 Gamification can help counteract some of the forces that lead people
not to save and invest, such as the perception that investing is boring or
complicated. In addition, gamification can have the positive effect of increasing
people’s motivation not just to invest but to invest successfully, leading to
greater take-up of tools to increase financial literacy.178 A 2021 Charles Schwab
survey, for example, reported those who began investing in 2020 were “hungry
for access to investing education and advice.”179
Similarly, from a market impact perspective, concerns over the effect of the
meme trading frenzy appear overstated.180 Price volatility has been concentrated
in a small number of stocks, primarily those with low prices and substantial short
interest.181 One reason is that retail money is still a relatively small percentage
of the overall market, meaning that, in liquid securities with broad-based
ownership, retail trading, in most cases, lacks the capacity to move prices
substantially. In addition, meme stock trading represents a very small percentage

175
Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Better Mkts.; Lev
Bagramian, Senior Sec. Pol’y Advisor, Better Mkts.; Stephen Hall, Legal Dir. & Sec.
Specialist, Better Mkts.; to Janet Yellen, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury; Jerome H. Powell,
Chariman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.; Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chairperson,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n; Rostin Benham, Acting Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n; John C. Williams, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York
4 (Feb. 3, 2021), https://bettermarkets.org/sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20
Letter%20to%20FSOC%20Regarding%20Gamestop%202-3-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJ54-V4GU].
176
Letter from Tyler Gellasch, supra note 158, at 19.
177
Gamification to Stock Fantasy¾A New and Eccentric Idea for Financial Services to
Engage and Educate Customers, VINFOTECH: BLOG
(June 9, 2021),
https://blog.vinfotech.com/fantasy-sports/gamification-and-stock-fantasy-a-new-idea-forfinancial-services-to-boost-user-engagement [https://perma.cc/NC5C-2K2M].
178
Id.; see infra Section V.C.
179
The Rise of the Investor Generation, supra note 106.
180
Game Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 112 (written testimony of Jennifer J. Schulp,
Director, Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute) (“[T]emporary volatility in GameStop
and others did not present a systemic risk to the functioning of our markets.”).
181
But see Philippe van der Beck & Coralie Jaunin, The Equity Market Implications of the
Retail Investment Boom 24-25 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Rsch. Paper No. 21-12, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3776421
[https://perma.cc/FDM3JQZE] (finding retail trading can move prices in both smaller stocks and those with substantial
passive ownership).
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of the overall market.182 As one article observes, citing industry experts, “it’s a
stretch to think that extreme market movement in a few, relatively lowcapitalized companies will have any major effect on the broader market.”183
In addition, retail trading can potentially increase market stability by
offsetting the herding by institutional investors that has the potential to
exacerbate price swings. Jonathan Macey observes, for example, that
“Robinhood investors had a stabilizing effect on the market during the
turbulence surrounding the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic, when the
market dropped in value by one-third.”184 Similarly Gideon Ozik, Ronnie Sadka,
and Siyi Shen report that “while overall liquidity deteriorated during lockdown,
the increase in retail trading activity improved it, lowering stock bid-ask spreads
and the price impact of trades.”185
The characterization of trading in meme stocks as gambling also overstates
the case. The capital markets include a wide range of investors with different
motivations and time horizons and that use different sources of information. It
is almost impossible to judge in advance whose analyses are likely to be
correct.186 The evidence suggests, however, that a substantial proportion of retail
money was invested not in idiosyncratic companies but in conservative
companies that performed well.187
Even investments in the more extreme meme stocks that generated herd-like
behavior can be defended on fundamentals¾fundamentals that, at least in some
cases, appear to support the wisdom of the crowd. For example, activist Ryan
Cohen’s increasing involvement in GameStop and the prospect that his proposed
revisions to the company’s business strategy would result in a turnaround
offered reasons to invest.188 Similarly, despite warning investors about the
prospect that its stock price was inflated in 2021, AMC showed success in its

182

See, e.g., id. at 32 (reporting that Robinhood investors had 0.2% market share).
Jessica Mathews, How Much Are Meme Stocks Really Moving the Markets?, FORTUNE
(June 12, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/06/12/meme-stocks-moving-themarkets-gamestop-amc-clover/.
184
Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Regulation and Class Warfare, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 796, 819.
185
Gideon Ozik, Ronnie Sadka & Siyi Shen, Flattening the Illiquidity Curve: Retail
Trading During the COVID-19 Lockdown, 56 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 2356, 2358
(2021).
186
See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 89, at 43 (“People may disagree about the prospects
of GameStop and the other meme stocks, but those disagreements are what should lead to
price discovery rather than disruptions.”).
187
Ivo Welch, The Wisdom of the Robinhood Crowd, 77 J. FIN. 1489, 1523 (2022)
(reporting that Robinhood investors exhibited good timing and steadfastness and earned
“good portfolio returns”).
188
See supra notes 37-40, 50, 77 and accompanying text (discussing Cohen’s involvement
in GameStop).
183
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holiday operations and beat analyst expectations for Q4 2021.189 Although views
on the street are mixed, analysts have also identified reasons to believe that other
meme stocks have the potential for continued growth based on fundamental
analysis rather than hype.190
Hertz provides one of the best examples. Hertz was one of the original meme
stocks in 2020, and commentators warned that it was an example of uninformed
and irrational trading by retail investors flocking into a company that was headed
for bankruptcy.191 As commentator William Cohan wrote in 2020: “It is all pure
gambling. There is no circumstance—zero—where Hertz shareholders will ever
get a recovery once a plan of reorganization with creditors is agreed upon,
probably months from now.”192
Yet, as Matt Levine subsequently acknowledged, Cohan “turned out to be
totally wrong.”193 Almost a year later, Hertz accepted a buyout bid that enabled
it to emerge from bankruptcy and to pay its investors more than what any retail
investor had paid for the stock.194 Significantly, the meme frenzy was not just
about investors getting lucky. Retail support for the companies, and their stock

189

Will Feuer, AMC Revenue Guidance Beats Forecasts, Sending Stock Up, WALL ST. J,
Feb. 2, 2022, at B7 (“Shares of AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc. jumped as much as 13%
in premarket trading after the company posted preliminary fourth-quarter results that showed
revenue topping analyst expectations.”).
190
See, e.g., Bed, Bath & Beyond Stronger than Typical Meme Stocks: Analysts,
CAPITAL.COM (Aug. 19, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://capital.com/bed-bath-beyond-stronger-thantypical-meme-stocks-analysts [https://perma.cc/L9HV-RPQS] (identifying reasons why Bed
Bath & Beyond could increase in value independent of meme stock movement); Mercury
Rsch., Beyond The Noise, AMC Does Have Fundamental Value, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 31,
2021, 11:03 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4402349-beyond-noise-amc-fundamentalvalue (identifying potential growth for AMC based on fundamental value).
191
Emily Graffeo, Hertz: The Original Meme Stock Rises from the Ashes of Bankruptcy,
INSIDER:
MKTS.
INSIDER
(Aug.
2,
2021,
12:00
PM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/hertz-original-reddit-wallstreetbetsmeme-stock-exits-bankruptcy-2021-7 [https://perma.cc/2KYJ-EZ6Q] (“In a matter of weeks
after the bankruptcy announcement, traders bid up shares of Hertz by 825% percent while
Wall Street onlookers scratched their heads and wondered why retail investors were scooping
up shares of a company that couldn’t meet its debt obligations.”).
192
Matt Levine, Money Stuff: The Hertz Gamblers Were Right, BLOOMBERG (May 12,
2021, 12:51 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-05-12/money-stuffthe-hertz-gamblers-were-right (quoting former Wall Street banker William Cohan). Most
traditional analysts agreed. See Neal Freyman, Hertz Shareholders Win Big with Bankruptcy
Deal,
MORNING
BREW
(May
14,
2021),
https://www.morningbrew.com/daily/stories/2021/05/14/hertz-shareholders-win-bigbankruptcy-deal [https://perma.cc/B83V-3CFE].
193
Levine, supra note 192.
194
Graffeo, supra note 191.
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prices, facilitated access by all three companies to capital that created new
business opportunities that, in turn, arguably impacted their future prospects.195
Moreover, to the extent the concern is about speculation in the stock market,
speculative trading is not limited to, or even concentrated in, retail investors.
Many hedge funds use speculative trading strategies, including the extensive use
of options and derivatives.196 Similarly, stock prices regularly depart from what
some view to reflect fundamental value—bubbles and other examples of
temporary misalignments are commonplace. Given the difficulty in determining
when securities are under or overpriced, the claim that meme trading has
distorted prices is a problematic justification for regulatory intervention.197
IV. THE UNDERRECOGNIZED VALUE OF RETAIL INVESTING
The foregoing discussion summarizes and challenges the main concerns that
commentators have raised over the GameStop frenzy. The call for regulatory
intervention, and in particular for reforms that would introduce greater barriers
to retail trading¾such as banning payment for order flow, limiting user
interfaces that make app-based trading easy and accessible, and attempting to
limit the use of social media to disseminate investing information¾focuses
excessively on the potential costs imposed by retail trading. In so doing, the
debate over GameStop overlooks the benefits of the reemergence of the retail
investor. I argue in this Part that direct retail participation in the capital markets
provides potential benefits to investors, corporations, and society—benefits that
have largely been unrecognized. As Abe Cable has observed, current regulatory
proposals are likely to “stamp out ultra-retail investing” thereby sacrificing these
benefits.198
For investors, capital market participation offers the opportunity for increased
wealth. Fintech, through its lower costs and easy access, allows a broader range
195
As Chiu and Yahya ask, “did [meme investors’] newfound faith in GameStop allow its
management to discover new opportunities that did not exist prior to early 2021?” Victoria
Chiu & Moin A. Yahya, The Meme Stock Paradox, 3 CORP. & BUS. L.J. 51, 89 (2022). Levine
explains that the SEC seemingly restricted Hertz’s ability to obtain more capital through a
public offering despite Hertz’s warning to stockholders that “we expect that common stock
holders would not receive a recovery through any plan.” Levine, supra note 192.
196
See, e.g., Silla Brush, Energy Speculation Highest on Record, CFTC’s Chilton Says,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0315/hedge-fund-energy-speculation-highest-on-record-cftc-s-bart-chilton-says.html
(describing widespread hedge fund speculation in energy markets).
197
See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1000 n.100 (“Nor, for
that matter, should the SEC be in the business of regulating to prevent bubbles in any
particular type of asset class or investment vehicle or to discourage speculation (in any case,
how does one decide when a bubble exists or that there is excessive speculation?).”); Game
Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 112 (written testimony of Jennifer J. Schulp, Director,
Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute) (“Stock prices move in and out of alignment all
the time, and markets are no strangers to bubbles.”).
198
Cable, supra note 101 (manuscript at 6).
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of investors to engage with the markets, not just as passive investors but through
the exercise of greater voice in corporate decisions. Direct retail ownership gives
ordinary citizens both a connection to business and a stake in how business
operates. Unlike efforts to increase the accountability of big corporations
through external regulation, investment offers people the opportunity to
influence businesses from within. Significantly, the GameStop frenzy highlights
the new power of fintech and social media to reduce the collective action
problems associated with dispersed retail ownership. Retail ownership can also
reduce the potentially skewed influence of large institutional intermediaries who
may be subject to problematic agency costs. Engaging ordinary citizens is
particularly valuable at a time when the role of corporations in society is up for
debate as commentators and policymakers question the relative merits of
shareholder versus stakeholder governance.
A.

GameStop and Capital Market Participation

As SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce recently observed, “Our financial
markets are among the greatest wealth-generating machines ever developed by
any society,” yet only about half of Americans participate in them through stock
or mutual fund ownership.199 In addition, retail participation in the markets is
highly skewed. Women are less likely to own stock than men.200 Minority
households are far less likely to own stock than white households,201 and this
lower rate of capital market participation substantially contributes to wealth
disparity.202 Traditionally, younger investors have been less likely to invest in
the stock market. As recently as 2016, one study reported that almost 80% of

199

Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Prosperity’s Door (July 21,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-prosperity-door-072121
[https://perma.cc/95RE-GAQ2].
200
Erin El Issa, Survey: Less Than Half of Women in U.S. Invest in the Stock Market,
NERDWALLET (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/survey-lessthan-half-of-women-in-u-s-invest-in-the-stock-market
[https://perma.cc/68WG-8ME2]
(reporting NerdWallet survey findings that only “48% of women, compared to 66% of men”
invest in stock market).
201
See Bo Evans, Black Americans Not Investing in the Stock Market, and It’s Costing
Them,
DENVER
CHANNEL
(Mar.
8,
2021,
7:02
PM),
https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/national/black-americans-not-investing-in-thestock-market-and-its-costing-them
[https://perma.cc/QN98-UFSB]
(quoting
Yosef
Bonaparte, Economics Professor at University of Colorado Denver, as saying, “61% of whites
participate in the stock market whereas 28% of African Americans participate in the stock
market”).
202
Stan Choe, Stocks Are Soaring, and Most Black People Are Missing Out, ABC NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2020, 8:01 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/stocks-soaring-blackpeople-missing-73567655 [https://perma.cc/Y2UX-9Q46] (“Researchers say increased
investment by racial minorities in the stock market, carried through future generations, could
help narrow the wealth gap.”).
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millennials were not invested in the stock market at all.203 A 2021 Nasdaq
Foundation study pointed to the ongoing underrepresentation of Black and
Latinx women in the capital markets and highlighted the systemic factors that
have contributed to the particular inability of this group to build wealth.204
Although a variety of factors contribute to the disparity in capital market
participation, one contributing factor is the inability of young and diverse
households to relate to the intermediaries that have historically served as
gatekeepers to the capital markets through their role as brokers and financial
advisors. Most financial advisors, for example, are white, male, and over the age
of fifty.205 This leaves many people with the inability to relate to or trust stock
market investing, or with the belief that their business will not be welcome.206
As one commentator put it, “potential Black investors may feel that buying
stocks is not for them.”207
The cost of investing is another obstacle.208 Historically, brokerage accounts
required a minimum investment, and the fees associated with maintaining an
account and trading stock rapidly ate into the value of that investment. FINRA
rules, for example, continue to require a minimum balance of $2000 in a margin

203

Josh Weiss, Here’s why Millennials Aren’t Investing, CNBC (Apr. 1, 2016, 1:15 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/01/heres-why-millennials-arent-investing.html
[https://perma.cc/8UMR-395T].
204
STEVE HOLT, TIM FLACKE & GOSIA TOMASZEWKA, COMMOMWEALTH, A FRAMEWORK
FOR INCLUSIVE INVESTING: DRIVING STOCK MARKET PARTICIPATION TO CLOSE THE WEALTH
GAP FOR WOMEN OF COLOR 3-4 (2021), https://buildcommonwealth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/CW-A_Framework_for_Inclusive_Investing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EZ2-36E4].
205
See Press Release, J.D. Power, Technology, Social Media Critical to Bridging Financial
Advisor Age Gap, J.D. Power Finds (July 9, 2019), https://www.jdpower.com/business/pressreleases/2019-us-financial-advisor-satisfaction-study
[https://perma.cc/QVV5-6FVV]
(reporting “average age of financial advisors is about 55, and approximately one-fifth of
advisors are 65 or older”); Greg Iacurci, Diversity Among Financial Planners Improved in
2021¾But It Still Remains Overwhelmingly White and Male, CNBC (Jan. 26, 2022, 2:11
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/26/diversity-among-financial-planners-improved-in2021-but-it-still-lags.html [https://perma.cc/H6VW-BQ68] (reporting that, of 92,055
certified financial planners in 2021, 83% were white, 76.6% were male, and 71.5% were forty
or older); Blair duQuesnay, Consider Firing Your Male Broker, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2019, at
A23 (reporting that fewer than 20% of financial advisors are women).
206
See Evans, supra note 201 (“Research shows that having someone who looks like you
and has shared life experiences lead [sic] to more trust.”).
207
Choe, supra note 202.
208
See, e.g., Michael Reher & Stanislav Sokolinski, Automation and Inequality in Wealth
Management
2-3
(Sept.
1,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3515707
[https://perma.cc/3HMNVXCC] (finding reduction in investment adviser’s account minimum increased participation
by middle income households and led to increases in expected wealth).
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account, although the minimum is not required for fully paid securities.209 The
entry into the market of app-based brokers like Robinhood has led to the
elimination of commissions even among traditional brokers.210 Commissionfree trading makes it cost-effective for investors to purchase relatively small
amounts of stock. The absence of account minimums and commissions makes it
easier for new investors to start small and limit the risks that they take as they
develop familiarity with the investment process. This flexibility is further
enhanced by the sale of fractional shares or stock slices. As the dollar amount
required to invest in a specific company decreases, small investors can diversify
their portfolios more easily, reducing the risks associated with direct stock
ownership and reducing the need for investors to purchase mutual funds to
achieve diversification.211
App-based trading platforms empower new, younger, and more diverse
investors by removing the obstacle of a person who does not look like them.
These new investors can participate on a small scale and develop a comfort level
without concern about someone who views their account as too small or makes
judgments about whether they belong in the market, a process that one
commentator terms “financial redlining.”212
Traditionally, retail investors have participated in the capital markets through
investments that are highly intermediated. Most investors own equities through
mutual funds, in which a portfolio manager chooses the individual securities.
The asset manager also exercises the other aspects of stock ownership, such as
participating in annual meetings and voting the shares.213 In addition, retail
investing occurs largely through employer-provided 401(k) plans in which the
employer provides a menu of mutual fund options, and retail investors select
among the choices provided in that menu.214 Because of the fiduciary obligations
209

FINRA Rule 4210(b). Margin Requirements, FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH.,
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/4210 (last visited Oct. 25, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/8KEU-K2U5].
210
See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 89, at 7-8 (observing that, after Robinhood’s
policies of allowing investors to trade with no account minimums or commissions received
“considerable attention,” other brokers began to adopt similar policies).
211
See Game Stopped? Part I, supra note 8, at 110 (written testimony of Jennifer Schulp,
Director, Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute) (noting rise in retail investors and
research showing that “the ability to invest with a small amount of money was a commonly
cited reason for opening an account for the first time in 2020”).
212
Neal Freyman, Black Investors Trade Their Way Through the Pandemic, MORNING
BREW (May 15, 2021), https://www.morningbrew.com/daily/stories/2021/05/15/blackinvestors-trade-way-pandemic [https://perma.cc/9S58-7D6K] (quoting Tyrone Ross,
financial consultant and CEO of investment platform Onramp Invest).
213
See Fisch, The Empty Voting Problem, supra note 1, at 83 (terming this practice “empty
voting”).
214
See Irina Ivanova, Stock Market’s Fall Has Wiped Out $3 Trillion in Retirement
Savings This Year, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (June 17, 2022, 8:00 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/stocks-drop-recession-retirement-savings-401k-ira-3-
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imposed on employers by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), these choices typically involve highly diversified funds with a large
number of portfolio securities.215 As a result, the connection between retail
investors and the specific companies in which their money is invested is highly
attenuated. ERISA also authorizes employers to cause plan participants to invest
into a default investment option if they do not make an affirmative investment
choice,216 and approximately 50% of plan assets are invested in the default
option, meaning that a substantial number of retail investors may not even fully
appreciate how their money is being invested.217
In contrast, low-cost, app-based trading facilitates direct stock ownership by
retail investors. In addition to potentially reducing the investment costs
associated with intermediation, such as advisory fees and taxes,218 direct
ownership is likely to engage young retail investors. Simply put, app-based
platforms make investing easier and more fun. They also give investors the
opportunity to purchase companies that they are familiar with and that affect the
world around them.219 As one commentator puts it, “millennials aren’t interested
in owning boring bonds. This is a generation of stock pickers.”220 It is fair to
believe that the enhanced opportunity for direct investing explains, in part, why
millennials “piled into stocks like never before in 2020.”221 In addition, although

trillion-2022/ [https://perma.cc/88XQ-S5G7] (“Retirement accounts are the main channel
through which most Americans are exposed to the ups and downs of the stock market.”).
215
See Fisch, Securities Intermediaries, supra note 1, at 1984 (explaining “employers must
offer their employees a range of diversified investment options” to qualify for ERISA’s
liability exemption for investment losses).
216
See DAVID BLANCHETT & DANIEL BRUNS, MORNINGSTAR, WHICH DEFAULT
INVESTMENT
IS
THE
STICKIEST?
1-2
(2019),
https://www.fi360.com/uploads/media/wp_Sticky_Default_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UQ2P-CP42].
217
See id.
218
Investors in mutual funds, for example, may pay taxes every year on the gains they
realize in such funds, even if they do not take any distributions. See, e.g., Roger Young, Endof-Year Tax Considerations for Capital Gains: Understanding Mutual Fund Distributions, T.
ROWE
PRICE
(Aug.
23,
2022),
https://www.troweprice.com/personalinvesting/resources/insights/understanding-capital-gains-and-taxes-on-mutual-funds.html
[https://perma.cc/XE2K-ACG2]. In some cases, the fund may be managed in a way that
exacerbates the tax consequences for small investors. See Jason Zwieg, Vanguard Forgets the
Little Guy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2022, at B5 (explaining how fund trading decisions resulted
in unexpectedly large tax bills for retail investors).
219
See Stephen McBride, Millennials Will Propel Stocks Higher for Years, FORBES (Feb.
8, 2021, 9:33 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenmcbride1/2021/02/08/millennialswill-propel-stocks-higher-for-years/?sh=56856fff6e5d (“[Y]oung folks LOVE investing in
companies changing the world.”).
220
Id.
221
Id.
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meme stocks may initially draw new investors into the market, studies suggest
that most go on to diversify their portfolios.222
These developments have contributed to a substantial shift in capital market
participation. Research by FINRA and the National Opinion Research Center
(“NORC”) at the University of Chicago found that investors who opened
accounts for the first time in 2020 were younger, had lower incomes, and were
more diverse than traditional investors.223 FINRA also found that these new
accounts were smaller in size, suggesting that the increased participation
reflected a more equitable approach to stock market participation.224 For Black
investors in particular, GameStop and Robinhood have led, according to one
survey, to “63% of Black Americans under 40 . . . participating in the stock
market, the same share as white Americans” and a higher share than at any time
in history.225 Robinhood has also released research showing a dramatic increase
in Latinx investors’ participation in the capital markets.226 As detailed below,
this democratization of the shareholder class has important implications not just
for investor wealth but for its impact on corporate America.
B.

GameStop and Citizen-Capitalism

The increase in direct retail ownership has the potential to change the
relationship between ordinary citizens and corporations. Almost a century ago,
Louis Kelso, a political economist, identified the value in what he termed
citizen-capitalism, the connection between ordinary citizens and businesses that
could be achieved by making citizens into investors.227 Kelso believed that
222
See, e.g., Garnet Roach, Meme Stocks “a Gateway to Serious Investing,” Says
Public.com, IR MAG. (Sept. 20, 2021), https://www.irmagazine.com/technology-socialmedia/meme-stocks-gateway-serious-investing-says-publiccom
[https://perma.cc/7ZSR86RS] (reporting that 76% of “investors who first entered the markets via meme stocks have
gone on to diversify their portfolios”).
223
MARK LUSH, ANGELA FONTES, MEIMEIZI ZHU, OLIVIA VALDES & GARY MOTTOLA,
INVESTING 2020: NEW ACCOUNTS AND THE PEOPLE WHO OPENED THEM 2 (2021),
https://www.finrafoundation.org/sites/finrafoundation/files/investing-2020-new-accountsand-the-people-who-opened-them_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD5J-B65D].
224
News Release, Angelita Williams & Eric Young, FINRA, New Research: Global
Pandemic Brings Surge of New and Experienced Retail Investors into the Stock Market (Feb.
2,
2021),
https://www.finra.org/media-center/newsreleases/2021/new-research-globalpandemic-brings-surge-new-and-experienced-retail [https://perma.cc/8LNV-ZKV2].
225
Freyman, supra note 212.
226
See, e.g., Gretchen Howard, Latinx Investors Are Part of the New Wall Street,
ROBINHOOD (Oct. 12, 2021), https://blog.robinhood.com/news/2021/10/12/latinx-investorsare-the-new-face-of-wall-street-and-crypto [https://perma.cc/3UWB-FQYE] (reporting
survey data on capital markets participation by Latinx investors through Robinhood platform).
227
See LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 40, 99 (1958)
(“Just as the status of citizenship conferred upon all has achieved political democracy, so the
individual and private ownership of capital by all households would achieve economic
democracy.”). Kelso was not the only person to advocate this approach. See, e.g., JOSEPH R.
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facilitating the acquisition of capital by ordinary citizens—workers and
consumers—would allow those citizens a greater share in the gains generated by
the increasing productivity of that capital.228
Kelso invented the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (or “ESOP”).229 One key
benefit to employee stock ownership, in Kelso’s view, was that broader capital
ownership could reduce the gap between the rich and the poor by enabling
ordinary citizens to own a meaningful share in the growth of the economy.230
The ESOP would increase the motivation of employees to make the company
successful, because those efforts would redound to their benefit as
stockholders.231 Finally, employee stock ownership would unite the interests of
management, employees, public stockholders and consumers.232
Kelso discussed General Motors as an example of how ESOPs could facilitate
the connection between employees and the companies for which they work.233
He highlighted the potential for using an ESOP to fuel corporate growth, which
could then be shared with the employees through employee-owned stock. As
Kelso explained, the ESOP would give workers “the ability to buy capital and
pay for it out of what that capital produces, thus raising employees’ incomes
without raising the employer’s labor costs.”234 In addition to incentivizing
BLASI, RICHARD B. FREEMAN & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE CITIZEN’S SHARE: PUTTING
OWNERSHIP BACK INTO DEMOCRACY 10 (2013) (arguing that allowing workers to share
ownership and profits is way to restore middle class).
228
See Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values,
Constraints and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American
“Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 127-28 (2005) (explaining Kelso’s idea to
“facilitate the outright acquisition by capitally disenfranchised wage-laborers and others of
new generative sources of income”); see also Louis O. Kelso & Patricia Hetter Kelso, Could
an
ESOP
Save
General
Motors?,
KELSO
INST.
(Nov.
1981),
http://kelsoinstitute.org/louiskelso/literary-legacy/could-an-esop-save-general-motors/
[https://perma.cc/D22L-T9MM] (describing ESOP as “enormous step toward the unification
of the interests of management (who would be participants in the Kelso ESOP), employees,
public stockholders, and consumers”).
229
Burt A. Folkart, Louis Kelso; Force Behind Employee Stock Ownership Plans, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, at A24 (describing Kelso as “maverick investment banker and selfstyled economist who conceived of today’s popular employee stock ownership plans”).
Previously, Kelso had advocated for government grants to enable ordinary citizens to invest
in the stock market. Louis O. Kelso & Patricia Hetter, Equality of Economic Opportunity
Through Capital Ownership, in SOCIAL POLICIES FOR AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES: NINE
DIVERGENT VIEWS 147 (Robert Theobold ed., 1968) (“[M]eans need to be found to enable the
poor man, who cannot afford belt-tightening, to finance the acquisition of newly formed
capital in the same manner as the rich man, whose consumption is not necessarily restricted
by his capital-acquiring activities.”).
230
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 228.
231
Id. (arguing ESOP would “powerfully motivate[]” employees “to make GM (‘their
company’) succeed in international and domestic competition”).
232
Id.
233
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 228.
234
Id.
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worker productivity, the ESOP would increase employee voice through their
participation as shareholders.235 Kelso’s writings influenced Congress to include
ESOPs in ERISA in 1974.236 Although ESOPs have been controversial, a variety
of studies demonstrate correlations between ESOPs and corporate
profitability.237
Significantly, ESOPs increase a company’s ownership by ordinary employees
as opposed to either a wealthy investor class or institutional intermediaries. This
change in ownership can affect a company in several ways. As Brett McDonnell
has observed in connection with the standard ESOP: “First, differences in
ownership may change the objectives we can expect companies to pursue.
Second, different ownership and control structures may affect the incentives and
motivation of individual employees. Third, employee ownership and control
may affect what information companies are able to use in making decisions.”238
The downside of ESOPs is that they may cause worker-participants to be
under-diversified as investors. A host of employees suffered substantial losses
when the stock of their employers fell precipitously, whether due to economic
events or fraud.239 As Judge Posner observed, “[t]he time may have come to
rethink the concept of an ESOP, a seemingly inefficient method of wealth
accumulation by employees because of the under-diversification to which it
conduces.”240
The benefits that Kelso identified of citizen capitalism—providing ordinary
citizens with a stake in the success of business operations, giving them a say in
business decisions as corporate shareholders, and providing a communication
mechanism between management and shareholders, employees, customers and
other stakeholders—are not limited to the ESOP, however.241 The same benefits
235

Id.
Ezra S. Field, Note, Money for Nothing and Leverage for Free: The Politics and History
of the Leveraged ESOP Tax Subsidy, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 740, 750 (1997) (observing Kelso’s
“efforts were largely responsible for getting ESOPs included into ERISA in 1974”).
237
See, e.g., Jedidiah J. Kroncke, ESOPs and the Limits of Fractionalized Ownership,
2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 287, 300-01 (discussing literature on ESOP company profitability,
including studies that show “two to three percent increases in ESOP profitability relative to
their corporate cohort”).
238
Brett McDonnell, ESOPs’ Failures: Fiduciary Duties when Managers of EmployeeOwned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 231.
239
See David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 113, 118 (2002) (“When Enron’s stock price collapsed—falling from a high of nearly
$90 per share in 2000 to its current price of about $.25—employees lost up to 99% of the
value of their retirement accounts.”).
240
Summers v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1245, 1257 (2007).
241
Lynn Stout, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, and Tamara Belinfanti offer a somewhat
different view of citizen capitalism in their influential book. See LYNN STOUT, SERGIO
GRAMITTO & TAMARA BELINFANTI, CITIZEN CAPITALISM: HOW A UNIVERSAL FUND CAN
PROVIDE INFLUENCE AND INCOME TO ALL 25 (2019). As with the ESOP, Stout, Gramitto Ricci,
236
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can be realized through direct stock market participation. Direct ownership does
not come with the baggage of the undiversified ESOP, in which a citizen’s stake
is primarily tied to a single business, particularly a business in which that
citizen’s human capital is also invested. Moreover, direct ownership similarly
heightens the financial partnership between corporations and the stakeholders
with whom the corporation deals, giving those stakeholders an interest in the
corporation’s success. The New York Stock Exchange and a number of
brokerage firms recognized the potential value of this partnership in the mid
1900’s and mounted a publicity campaign to encourage stock ownership by
ordinary investors, terming it a “people’s capitalism.”242
By including a greater percentage of ordinary people as owners of capital,
citizen capitalism can reduce the economic inequality that can otherwise result
from capitalist forces, providing a response to Thomas Piketty’s famous
criticism of capitalism.243 Some have termed this approach “inclusive
capitalism.”244 Inclusive capitalism can be understood as providing benefits to
individuals by increasing their access to societal wealth and, in particular, the
wealth gains produced by corporations. Inclusive capitalism can also increase
societal stability by reducing wealth and income inequality.245
Citizen capitalism may also enhance the voice of ordinary citizens in
corporate decisions. Corporate law vests the board of directors with the ultimate
responsibility for determining the direction of a corporation.246 Shareholders
play a role in corporate operations by electing that board.247 They play an
and Belinfanti posit an intermediated form of ownership. As this Article explains below, direct
ownership adds engagement and accountability to the economic participation offered by
Stout, Gramitto Ricci, and Belinfanti’s proposed universal fund.
242
The New York Stock Exchange campaign operated under the slogan, “Own Your
Share.” See Cable, supra note 101 (manuscript at 10-11) (describing campaign); Janice
Traflet, Spreading the Ideal of Mass Shareownerhip: Public Relations and the NYSE, 22
ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 257, 257, 266-67 (2004) (discussing efforts to promote retail
investing).
243
See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013).
244
See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, The Inclusive Capitalism Shareholder Proposal, 17 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 147, 153 (2017) (defining inclusive capitalism as “the act of financing
corporate operations via a broader distribution of capital paid for by the future earnings of the
distributed capital”); Robert Ashford, Why Working but Poor? The Need for Inclusive
Capitalism, 49 AKRON L. REV. 507, 508 (2016) (“[W]e must establish a more inclusive
capitalism by democratizing ‘capital acquisition with the earnings of capital’ based on the
principles of ‘binary economics.’”).
245
See, e.g., Sylvia Ostry, When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It: Reflections on
North American Integration: Regional and Multilateral, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 239, 245
(2005) (“[M]ost experts agree that inequality and poverty . . . pose a serious threat to the
sustainability of democracy.”).
246
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2022) (“The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors.”).
247
See, e.g., id. § 211(b).
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indirect role through capital market discipline—allocating money to those
companies whose business plans the market views as desirable. In addition,
shareholders can raise issues of concern and highlight problematic corporate
practices, including corporate governance, ESG issues, and operational
decisions, through the shareholder proposal rule.248 The power of shareholder
action continues to increase. For example, tiny hedge fund Engine No. 1
dramatically spotlighted Exxon’s refusal to address climate change through its
successful 2021 proxy contest.249 Weeks later, Exxon announced its plan to
achieve net zero greenhouse gas emission by 2050.250 A recent study reports that
the first three years of the Big Three’s campaign to increase gender diversity on
corporate boards led to a “76% increase in the net flow of new female board
members and an 11% increase in the overall proportion of female directors.”251
Although recent examples of shareholder power focus on institutional
investors, shareholder power is not limited to institutions; retail investors can
also play a critical role. Due to the conservatism of institutional investors, retail
investors generate the majority of shareholder proposals and are typically the
source of most innovation in such proposals. For the proposals to impact
corporate behavior, however, they must ultimately command the support of
institutions as well. Similarly, in issuers with significant retail ownership, the
retail vote can influence the outcome of critical shareholder votes. DuPont’s
ability to earn the support of its retail shareholders was pivotal, for example, in
its ability to ward off an activist challenge by hedge fund Trian.252
The GameStop frenzy has expanded retail influence. Retail investors in
GameStop, AMC, and other meme stocks demonstrated an unprecedented power
to influence capital market pricing even in direct opposition to efforts by
institutional investors such as hedge funds. The virtual shareholder meetings
248

17 C.F.R. § 14a-8 (2021).
See Matt Phillips, How a Tiny Green Fund Turned the Exxon Tanker, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2021, at B3 (reporting Engine No. 1 “successfully waged a battle to install three directors
on the board of Exxon with the goal of pushing the energy giant to reduce its carbon
footprint”).
250
ExxonMobil Announces Ambition for Net Zero Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2050,
EXXONMOBIL:
NEWSROOM
(Jan.
18,
2022),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/News/Newsroom/Newsreleases/2022/0118_ExxonMobil-announces-ambition-for-net-zero-greenhouse-gasemissions-by-2050 [https://perma.cc/4WQS-F7RP].
251
Todd A. Gormley, Vishal K. Gupta, David A. Matsa, Sandra C. Mortal & Lukai Yang,
The Big Three and Board Gender Diversity: The Effectiveness of Shareholder Voice 9 (Eur.
Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Fin.
Working
Paper
No.
714/2020,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3724653
[https://perma.cc/W3SL2KVJ].
252
Jeff Mordock, Retail Shareholders Cited as Key to DuPont’s Victory, DEL. ONLINE
(May
13,
2015,
8:06
PM),
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2015/05/13/trian-rebuffed-dupontslate-wins-seats/27226613/ (“Peltz and DuPont CEO Ellen Kullman cited retail
investors . . . for turning the election in favor of the company’s director slate.”).
249
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resulting from the pandemic lockdown provide a more accessible forum in
which shareholders can participate in a dialogue with issuer management. Some
brokers such as Robinhood have developed mechanisms to facilitate the
submission of retail shareholders’ questions at such meetings.253 Sergio Ricci
and Christina Sautter argue that the actions of retail investors at issuers like
GameStop and AMC demonstrate retail investors’ ability to use new technology
such as social media to overcome traditional collective action problems.254 Ricci
and Sautter predict that this will cause retail investors to engage not just with
stock trading but with corporate governance.255
Significantly, retail participation in corporate governance offers a new tool
for ordinary citizens to hold corporations accountable for their actions. As
Joseph Blasi, Richard Freeman, and Douglas Kruse observed in 2013, “the
public has grown increasingly critical of corporations and suspicious of the
relationship between big government and the big corporate sector.”256 In 2018,
“[a] majority of Americans [viewed] large businesses as self-serving and selfdealing.”257 Both Democrats and Republicans increasingly believe that
corporations wield too much power.258 Data from interactive investors show that
retail shareholders’ efforts to use their voting power to increase corporate
accountability have grown dramatically.259 Retail shareholders are also using
ESG-oriented shareholder proposals to seek greater transparency on a variety of
controversial corporate practices from political spending to human rights.260

253
See, e.g., Lewis Braham, Robinhood’s New Proxy Platform Battles Investor Apathy,
BARRON’S, Oct. 25, 2021, at 27 (describing Robinhood’s acquisition of Say Technology to
create platform enabling individual shareholders to ask questions of corporate management).
254
Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Corporate Governance Gaming:
The Collective Power of Retail Investors, 22 NEV. L.J. 51, 84-86 (2021).
255
Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina Sautter report that “80% of Gen Z
shareholders have already voted in annual shareholder meetings, exceeding every other
generation of shareholders.” Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, The
Wireless Investors Movement, U. CHI. BUS. L. REV. (Jan. 28, 2022),
https://businesslawreview.uchicago.edu/2022/01/28/the-wireless-investorsmovement%EF%BF%BC/ [https://perma.cc/N8DX-FBPF].
256
Blasi, Freeman & Kruse, supra note 227, at 10.
257
Robert D. Atkinson & Michael Lind, Is Big Business Really That Bad?, ATLANTIC, Apr.
2018, at 22, 22.
258
Ben Casselman & Jim Tankersley, Parties Agree: Big Business Wields Too Much
Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2021, at B1.
259
Alex Rolandi, Number of Retail Investors Using Vote to Hold Corporates Accountable
Increases
110%,
INV.
WK.
(Jan.
10,
2022),
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/news/4042985/retail-investors-vote-hold-corporatesaccountable-increases-110 (reporting that one platform processed twice as many retail votes
in 2021 as in 2020).
260
See, e.g., Gabe Rissman, New Strategies Help Investors Hold Corporations
Accountable on Human Rights, OPEN GLOB. RTS. (May 16, 2019),
https://www.openglobalrights.org/new-strategies-help-investors-hold-corporations-
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Greater disclosure subjects those practices to greater scrutiny, not just by
shareholders but by regulators, other stakeholders, and society at large.261 Ricci
and Sautter argue that retail engagement has the potential to reduce corporate
externalities and cause issuers to embrace a broader public interest,262 an idea
that will be explored in more detail below.263 At the same time, however, citizen
capitalism can also reshape ordinary citizens’ views of the corporate sector,
altering their preferences on how corporations are regulated.264
These developments have led issuers to pay growing attention to identifying
the concerns of their retail shareholders and addressing those concerns.
Following the outcome at DuPont, both Proctor & Gamble and activist hedge
fund Trian paid substantial attention to cultivating the votes of retail investors,
and those investors were ultimately pivotal in Trian’s victory.265 AMC CEO
Adam Aron began using Twitter and Reddit to communicate with the company’s
retail shareholders, engaging in an unprecedented level of transparency in which
Aron sought the views of his shareholder base on issues ranging from whether
AMC should accept cryptocurrency to executives cashing in their stock
options.266 Aron also shifted the focus of the company’s traditional quarter
earnings calls to addressing the concerns of retail investors.267 Investor relations
accountable-on-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/RK27-UZFT] (recounting how retail
investor used shareholder proposal process to push for human rights improvements at
ExxonMobil).
261
See BRAM HENDRIKS, INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS—AN ESSENTIAL INSTRUMENT FOR ENSURING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 16
(2021),
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/202112/ICGN%20Shareholder%20Proposal%20Viewpoint%20review%20021221%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UGW-5SQJ].
262
Gramitto Ricci & Sautter, supra note 254, at 94 (describing how increased retail
engagement leads to wider disbursement of shares and, ultimately, internalization of corporate
externalities).
263
See infra Section IV.D.
264
For evidence that the transformation of workers into investors leads them to oppose
more stringent regulatory policies, see Stefano Pagliari, Lauren M. Phillips & Kevin L.
Young, The Financialization of Policy Preferences: Financial Asset Ownership, Regulation
and Crisis Management, 18 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 655, 674 (2020) (“[O]wnership of financial
assets is associated with lower levels of support for more stringent regulatory policies
targeting the financial industry.”).
265
Michael Flaherty, P&G, Peltz Vie for Small Investor Votes in Biggest-Ever Proxy Fight,
REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2017, 7:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-procter-gambletrian-investors/pg-peltz-vie-for-small-investor-votes-in-biggest-ever-proxy-fightidUSKCN1C01CW.
266
Alex Morrell, How AMC CEO Adam Aron Conquered Twitter, Embraced the “Apes”
of Reddit, and Won Over a New Generation of Investors, INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2021, 3:41 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amc-adam-aron-twitter-reddit-investors-meme-stock2021-12 [https://perma.cc/U4MN-JRZT].
267
Id. (“AMC quarterly earnings calls, which used to cater to Wall Street research analysts,
now revolve around retail investors and their ideas for the company, which involve questions
about crypto, NFTs, AMC merch, eSports, and more.”).
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specialists are counseling issuers not just to pay attention to retail investors but
to develop strategies for doing so, including taking advantage of the company’s
website and making greater use of social media.268 And corporate executives are
using new tools to connect with retail investors and respond to their concerns.269
Direct investment is necessary, however, for retail shareholders to play an
effective role in influencing corporate behavior.270 Critically, capital ownership
is not enough. Shareholders who own equity through intermediated investments
such as mutual funds do not have the right to participate in corporate governance.
They do not have the authority to introduce shareholder proposals.271 They do
not even have the right to vote the shares reflecting their proportionate
ownership interest in the portfolio companies held by the fund.272 In addition to
depriving investors of say in their portfolio companies, intermediation deprives
investors of engagement. There is little reason for investors to pay attention to
the 500 or 2000 portfolio companies held by their diversified index funds. Not
only do investors have no connection to the choice to invest in those companies,
but intermediation and diversification sever the connection between the
investors’ financial returns and individual firm behavior. Moreover, as detailed
in the next Section, there are reasons to question whether the interests of
institutional investors and the issues on which they chose to engage are
representative of retail investors’ interests.
C.

GameStop and Intermediation

A key advantage of direct retail ownership is that it restores shareholder
influence over corporate decisions to those who have an economic interest in
those decisions. The growth of intermediated investing has resulted in a
relatively small number of institutional investors exercising a substantial amount
of control over corporate decisions. John Coates identified this concern, warning
that “control of most public companies—that is, the wealthiest organizations in
the world, with more revenue than most states—will soon be concentrated in the

268

See Jeehae Linford, Recent Trends in Retail Investing: What Does It Mean for Issuers?,
IR MAG. (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.irmagazine.com/small-cap/recent-trends-retailinvesting-what-does-it-mean-issuers [https://perma.cc/V6EC-5KK2] (advising issuers to
publish accessible information on company’s website and engage with retail investors on
nontraditional platforms).
269
See, e.g., Nina Trentmann, Firms Try Relating to Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2022, at B1 (“Executives are turning to new methods, such as tools that analyze reams of data
and social-media platforms, to determine just who their small investors are and how to reach
them, while also using traditional approaches like shareholder letters and meetings.”).
270
This is where direct ownership provides a form of citizen capitalism that extends
beyond Stout, Gramitto, and Belinfanti’s universal fund proposal. See STOUT, GRAMITTO
RICCI & BELINFANTI, supra note 241, at 49-50 (proposing citizen capitalism through universal
fund through which all citizens can share in economic proceeds from capitalism).
271
Ari I. Weinberg, What to Know About . . . Proxy Voting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2022, at
R7.
272
Id.
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hands of a dozen or fewer people.”273 Coates warned that a small number of
people, through their control over the voting power in the portfolio companies
held by index funds in particular, could wield “unsurpassed power” over
corporate America.274
A particular area of concern involves the possibility that institutional investors
will use this power to the detriment of other societal interests. The common
ownership literature, for example, warns of the possible anticompetitive effects
when large institutions own substantial stakes in competing firms, and offers
empirical evidence in support of such effects.275 The empirical findings have led
regulators to initiate inquiries into these concerns.276 In response, some
commentators have sought to limit the size or holdings of large mutual funds.277
One man in particular, BlackRock’s Larry Fink, was described in 2010 “as
possibly the most important man in finance today.”278 Since 2010, Fink’s
influence has only increased. His annual letters to CEOs instruct corporate
America with respect to issues ranging from ESG to whether corporations
should get involved in voting rights legislation, and empirical research indicates
that corporations respond to Fink’s instructions.279 That responsiveness likely
results from the fact that Fink’s instructions are backed by BlackRock’s
substantial voting power and its ability to vote against director candidates or
CEO compensation packages if Fink is displeased with management’s
actions.280
Coates recognized but did not highlight that the people who make decisions
on behalf of the large institutional investors do not themselves hold the economic
stakes in the companies that they control but instead exercise that power on
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Coates, supra note 12, at 2.
Id. at 3.
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See, e.g., José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of
Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1517 (2018); Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership
Concentration and Corporate Conduct, 10 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 413, 428-33 (2018).
276
See, e.g., Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 15, at 1395-96 (describing inquiries by U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, and European Commission).
277
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Mortan & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit
the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (2017)
(proposing that institutional investors be limited “to a stake of no more than 1 percent in more
than a single firm in oligopolies”).
278
Suzanna Andrews, Larry Fink’s $12 Trillion Shadow, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2010, at 140,
142.
279
Andrea Pawliczek, A. Nicole Skinner & Laura A. Wellman, A New Take on Voice: The
Influence of BlackRock’s “Dear CEO” Letters, 26 REV. ACCT. STUDS. 1088, 1121 (2021)
(finding evidence that firms respond to BlackRock’s “Dear CEO” letters).
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Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, It’s Not “Woke” for Businesses to
Think Beyond Profit, BlackRock Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 17, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/17/business/dealbook/larry-fink-blackrock-letter.html
(explaining BlackRock’s $10 trillion in assets under management “gives Mr. Fink a huge
amount of influence”).
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behalf of dispersed individual fund shareholders.281 I have described this
exercise of shareholder power by asset managers as empty voting and argued
that it has the potential to create agency costs because the interests of those who
control fund voting decisions may not be aligned with the interests of the
beneficiaries of those funds.282
A growing number of commentators have expressed concern over empty
voting and the agency problems it creates.283 As former acting SEC chair Allison
Lee observed, mutual funds may not always reflect the preferences of their
investors when they vote their proxies, and “[a]ddressing this agency cost is at
the heart of corporate governance today.”284 The commentary identifies a variety
of reasons why the interests of institutional intermediaries may differ from those
of retail investors.285 These reasons include the business interests of the
institutions such as enabling them to secure revenues from the administration of
or inclusion in 401(k) plans,286 the personal views287 or political aspirations of
fund managers,288 and a fear of regulation or public retribution in response to the
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Coates, supra note 12, at 5 (finding public individuals remained dominant source of
capital “even if their investments were increasingly held by institutional investors”).
282
See Fisch, The Empty Voting Problem, supra note 1.
283
See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, “Public” Mutual Funds, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON
INVESTOR
PROTECTION
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
1),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3821388 [https://perma.cc/EWL8-Y7MY]; Bernard S. Sharfman,
Opportunism in the Shareholder Voting of the “Big Three” Investment Advisers to Index
Funds,
48
J.
CORP.
L.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
6-7),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995714
[https://perma.cc/Q84PPCMS] (arguing Big Three investment advisors should be treated as investors’ agents in funds
they manage as solution to “their opportunistic behavior”); Paul G. Mahoney & Julia D.
Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and ESG,
2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 840, 858, 860, 865; Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted
Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2019) (describing
adverse consequences of “empty voting” in relation to mutual funds and hedge funds).
284
Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Every Vote Counts:
The Importance of Fund Voting and Disclosure (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-every-vote-counts [https://perma.cc/D76A-UXGC].
285
This discussion focuses on the divergence of interests related to funds’ participation in
the governance of their portfolio companies. The mutual fund structure itself creates a distinct
set of conflicts and agency costs. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in
Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS. 161, 164 (2004) (describing conflicts resulting from funds’
compensation structures).
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See Griffith & Lund, supra note 283, at 1176 (terming these “corporate client”
conflicts).
287
Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 283, at 866 (stating that fund managers’ personal
views might explain predictable voting of money managers on shareholder proposals for
social and environmental issues).
288
Robin Wigglesworth, The Ten Trillion Dollar Man: How Larry Fink Became King of
Wall St, FT MAG. (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7dfd1e3d-e256-4656-a96d1204538d75cd [https://perma.cc/3GQF-L95S] (“A host of former government officials work
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asset managers’ size and power.289 Although empirical evidence on retail voting
is limited, it supports these concerns—retail investors vote differently from
institutional intermediaries.290
Scholars have identified possible ways to reduce the agency costs resulting
from empty voting, including mechanisms to provide mutual fund beneficiaries
with the power to influence how asset managers vote their shares.291 These
mechanisms are subject, however, to a variety of limitations. Most particularly,
people who invest indirectly through mutual funds are unlikely to be aware of,
and informed about, the portfolio companies owned by those funds. In addition,
they are particularly likely to suffer from rational apathy, both because of their
relatively small stakes and because they have not made the affirmative decision
to invest in the portfolio companies held through their funds.292 Indeed, many
mutual fund investors have not even made an affirmative decision to invest in
the fund itself, because they are automatically invested into the default option in
their employer’s 401(k) plan.293
As the preceding sections have detailed, however, when retail investors invest
directly, they are far more likely to be informed about the companies in which
289

Schwartz, supra note 283, at 1.
Alon Brav, Matthew Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder Participation in the
Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting, 144 J. FIN. ECON. 492, 493 (2021)
(documenting “substantial differences” between retail shareholders and institutional investors
on various categories of shareholder proposals).
291
See, e.g., Jill Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds, in GLOBAL
SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 470 (Dionysia
Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2022) (“[A] number of
commentators have demanded that [index funds] do more to influence the decisions made at
their portfolio companies.”); see also Sharfman, supra note 283, at 28-29 (summarizing
several feasible mechanisms by which retail investors could convey their voting preferences
to fund managers); Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index
Fund Giants, 79 MD. L. REV. 954, 983 (2020) (advocating pass-through voting).
292
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https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/12/new-tool-tells-you-if-your-401k-is-invested-in-privateprisons.html [https://perma.cc/DAL8-DSAZ] (quoting Andrew Behar, CEO of As You Sow,
as saying that many people are unaware that they are invested through their 401(k) plan “in
companies that don’t align with their values”).
293
The assets of plan participants who are automatically enrolled in a 401(k) plan as well
as those who have not selected another investment option are invested in the default
investment option designated by the employer. Most 401k plans use target date funds as the
default option. Stephen Miller, Number of 401(k) Funds Offered to Plan Participants Shrinks,
SHRM
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hrtopics/benefits/pages/number-of-401k-funds-offered-to-plan-participants-shrinks.aspx
[https://perma.cc/CR2M-LX8C] (reporting data from Fidelity that 92% of 401(k) plans use
target date funds as default option, and that among Millennials, 69% are “invested exclusively
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they invest.294 Early evidence since the GameStop frenzy suggests that this
engagement is extending to participation in corporate governance as well.295
Reducing the extent to which retail investment is intermediated by increasing
direct capital market participation by retail investors thus offers another potential
vehicle for reducing both the power of institutional intermediaries and the
agency costs resulting from intermediation.
D.

GameStop and the Stakeholder Debate

The reemergence of the retail investor has particularly significant
implications for the debate over stakeholder governance. Stakeholder
governance shifts the objective of the corporation from maximizing shareholder
economic value to delivering value to a variety of stakeholders, including
employees, customers, suppliers, communities, and the environment.296 At its
core, stakeholder governance is about using corporate governance to achieve
societal objectives that cannot be addressed adequately through regulation.297
The debate over stakeholder governance has been extensive. A threshold
question is whether stakeholder governance is an instrumental tool to enhance
shareholder value or an alternative objective that can or should be pursued even
when it is in tension with shareholder value. From a legal perspective,
commentators debate whether corporate managers can pursue stakeholder value
without violating their fiduciary duties to shareholders. From a practical
perspective, stakeholder governance requires corporate decisionmakers to
decide which stakeholders’ interests should be considered and how competing
interests should be prioritized.
A critical question is who decides whether a corporation should adopt
stakeholder governance and to what degree. Do a corporation’s managers or the
board of directors have the authority to embrace stakeholder governance,298 or
294

See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text (discussing companies’ information
campaigns and outreach to retail investors).
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See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 94 (2020) (describing stakeholderism).
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See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The
Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 367 (2021) (explaining renewed debate
over stakeholderism and corporate purpose as response to “the political polarization of our
electoral politics [that] has resulted in legislative deadlock”).
298
In 2019, the Business Roundtable, a membership organization of chief executive
officers, embraced stakeholder governance through its adoption of a “revised” statement of
corporate purpose. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote
“An Economy That Serves All Americans,” BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/U7A3EX37]. Although some commentators have viewed that statement as a commitment by the
employers of the signatories to the statement, as Bebchuk and Tallarita acknowledge, the
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should that decision require shareholder input or even formal structural
change?299 Even if the question involves shareholder input, stakeholder
governance presents distinctive agency problems because of the risk that
institutional intermediaries will support objectives that differ from the interests
of their beneficiaries.300
Because retail shareholders are themselves stakeholders, retail investing
offers an end-run around these complex issues. Retail shareholders do not simply
represent, but embody, the interests of employees, customers, the community,
and society at large. A retail shareholder’s interests reflect his or her overall role
in society, and each shareholder’s individual utility function reflects his or her
preferences with respect to stakeholder issues that include safe products, fair
treatment of employees, and harm to the environment, as well as economic
profit. As a result, retail investors, acting in their interests as shareholders,
engage in what might be termed “automatic stakeholder governance.”301
Of course, shareholders are likely to hold differing views on these questions.
Shareholders have heterogeneous preferences even with respect to economic
issues—they likely differ in the time horizon of their investment, their risk
preferences, the extent to which they favor cash dividends over growth, and their
tax situations. Other stakeholders have heterogeneous preferences as well.302 But
heterogeneity does not prevent these stakeholder views from being raised and
considered in a corporation’s operating decisions. In addition, a variety of
boards of those companies did not appear to play a role in the CEOs’ decisions to sign it.
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 296, at 130-31 (finding that out of forty-eight companies
contacted, forty-seven responded that decision to endorse Business Roundtable statement was
approved by only the CEO and not the board).
299
See generally Jill E. Fisch, Purpose Proposals, 1 U. CHI. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (describing shareholder efforts to cause corporations to adopt stakeholder governance
by converting to public benefit corporations).
300
See Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 283, at 843 (arguing that institutions cannot
sacrifice shareholder value for stakeholder values consistent with their fiduciary duties).
301
Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales argue that corporate managers have the legal authority
to respect shareholders’ noneconomic preferences. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales,
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT.
247, 263 (2017). Hart and Zingales do not, however, consider the agency problem discussed
above resulting from the intermediation of most shares. See id. Ironically, at least one study
has found that public pension funds, which might be viewed as natural advocates of employee
interests, do not appear to function as “effective instruments of worker power in the
aggregate” through their ownership of publicly traded companies. Larry Liu & Adam
Goldstein, Labor’s Capital and Worker Well-Being: Do US Pension Funds Benefit Labor
Interests?, 100 SOC. FORCES 1080, 1083 (2022) (concluding pension funds do not encourage
“labor-friendly behaviors” and that this trend has not shifted since the early 2000s).
302
See, e.g., Robert H. Mundheim, What Is the Significance of the Business Roundtable
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation?, SALZBERG GLOB. SEMINAR NEWSL. (Oct. 22,
2019), https://www.salzburgglobal.org/news/publications/article/robert-h-mundheim-whatis-the-significance-of-the-business-roundtable-statement-on-the-purpose-of-a-corporation
[https://perma.cc/M864-F76P] (using hypothetical to illustrate potential conflicting interest
among corporate employees).
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market mechanisms allow shareholders with different preferences to influence
corporations. Shareholders can choose which companies to invest in. They can
avoid companies whose policies they disagree with, or they can invest in those
companies and push their fellow shareholders to support change. Finally,
everyone does not have to agree. Unlike the institutional model of stakeholder
governance which seeks to impose a one-size-fits all level of social policy on all
businesses, direct ownership allows for variation among firms and practices.
To be fair, retail shareholders do not perfectly represent stakeholder interests.
Roughly half of U.S. citizens are not invested in the markets at all, and even
after the GameStop frenzy, those who invest are disproportionately white,
wealthy, and male.303 Shareholder votes are based on economic ownership,
meaning that large shareholders have greater voice. Despite these concerns, a
shareholder need not hold a substantial stake to influence corporate decisions.
The shareholder proposal rule, SEC Rule 14a-8,304 enables shareholders with
relatively small stakes to introduce shareholder proposals, thereby putting issues
of concern on the corporate agenda.305 Social media tools such as Reddit reduce
the costs of publicizing a proposal and mobilizing support.306
Historically, a substantial proportion of shareholder proposals have addressed
social policy issues and reflected stakeholder concerns.307 Toward this end, they
have been remarkably effective.308 Recent shareholder proposals have focused
on a variety of stakeholder concerns from workplace diversity and sexual
harassment policies to food and product safety. The 2020-2021 proxy season
saw retail investors sponsor new proposals at multiple companies seeking to
have them convert to public benefit corporations in order to commit to
stakeholder governance.309 Moreover, because many proposals seek to have
corporations provide greater disclosure of the negative externalities they impose
on stakeholders, they can have broader effects—increasing the transparency of
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See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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(describing shareholder proposal rule as “corporate town square”).
306
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corporate behavior and energizing stakeholders, regulators, or the public at large
to take action.310
Stakeholders can access this mechanism for focusing greater attention on their
interests through the simple process of buying stock. Indeed, corporate law has
a long history of stakeholders becoming shareholders and then using the
corporate machinery in an effort to change the corporation’s behavior. Harwell
Wells details how two retail shareholders in the 1940s attempted to use the
shareholder proposal rule to persuade Greyhound to eliminate its racially
segregated buses.311 In 2022, Amazon employee Daniel Olayiwola purchased
stock in Amazon and, at the 2022 shareholder meeting, introduced a shareholder
proposal seeking better treatment for Amazon workers.312 These efforts have
been facilitated by the SEC staff, which in 2021 announced a change to its
interpretation of Rule 14a-8 that opens the door to a more expansive use of
shareholder proposals to address stakeholder interests.313
Finally, the prospect that retail shareholders will reflect stakeholder interests
in their engagement with the corporations in which they invest is not mere
speculation; there is increasing evidence that retail investors care about
stakeholder considerations. One recent survey reported that “more than half
(51%) of retail investors avoid investing in certain stocks due to moral or ethical
concerns about a company’s business pursuits.”314 For millennials and GenZers, social justice issues—including climate change, racial justice, and
inequality—are increasingly important.315 Millennial investors—those who
entered the market in the greatest numbers as part of the GameStop frenzy—are
“the driving force in the adoption of socially responsible investment

310
Madison Condon details the use of shareholder proposals to address climate
externalities, although her examples focus on proposals introduced by institutional investors.
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312
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https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/02/not-all-investors-who-say-they-support-impactinvesting-are-doing-it.html [https://perma.cc/XN7Y-MB46].
315
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strategies.”316 As Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber explain, millennial investors
increasingly see a connection between investment activity and achieving broader
societal goals, and they are calling for the companies in which they invest to
give greater consideration to stakeholder interests.317 Although the extent to
which citizens will pursue stakeholder or societal goals in their role as investors
remains unclear, as Ricci and Sautter explain, “[c]itizens who hold a small
economic interest in a corporation would likely prioritize their interests as
human beings living in a society and on a shared planet when voting their
shares.”318
V.

SOME CAUTIONARY CONSIDERATIONS

The preceding Part has identified the benefits that the reemergence of the
retail investor can provide to corporations, the capital markets, and investors
themselves. These benefits should not be overstated. There are costs of increased
direct retail ownership. Investors will make mistakes such as excessive trading,
following the herd, inadequate diversification, and the use of financial products
that they do not understand. Even if investors learn from their mistakes, some
will lose money, perhaps more than they can afford to lose. Retail investors will
affect the capital markets, and other market participants will have to adjust. New
information sources will evolve and raise new opportunities for manipulation
and fraud.
For the reasons described above, this Article does not view the costs as
sufficient to warrant regulatory intervention motivated by paternalism. A more
difficult question is whether the retail investor mistakes will prevent issuers and
the market from benefiting from citizen capitalism. Although at present this
question is largely unanswerable, there are a few issues that warrant particular
attention.
A.

Social Media as a Source of Investment Information

The first issue is whether retail investing is sufficiently informed to confer the
benefits described in this Article. Retail investors who purchase stock as a social
movement or to be part of the crowd need not be interested in the corporation
that issues the stock or engaged in its underlying business. Such investors are
unlikely to make informed trades, vote their shares, or seek to hold managers
accountable. In a sense, the governance role of frenzied retail investors might be
closely analogous to that of algorithmic traders—that is, nonexistent.319
316
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This position is likely exaggerated; empirical evidence to date suggests that a
substantial proportion of retail trading is informed and that retail investors are
increasingly engaging with the companies in which they invest.320 Retail
investors rely, however, on nontraditional sources of information. In particular,
retail investors appear to be heavily influenced by postings on social media
sites.321 One study reported that a third of young investors rely on social media
for investment advice.322 The European Securities and Markets Authority
warned investors to “be careful when taking investment decisions based
exclusively on information from social media and other unregulated online
platforms, if they cannot verify the reliability and quality of that information.”323
To be sure, social media presents an ever-growing danger of misinformation
and disinformation that can manipulate the behavior of users¾a danger that
extends well beyond the capital markets.324 A collaborative study explored the
role of social media in spreading both misinformation and mistrust in connection
with the COVID-19 pandemic.325 Commentators have highlighted the role that
social media platforms played in the January 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection,326
and debated Facebook’s use of algorithms to promote posts that are likely to

320
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generate outrage or other strong reactions.327 Social media provides users with
the potential to reach a greater audience than other communication mediums,
and to do so with limited accountability.328 The ability to post anonymously has
been cited as creating the potential for lack of civility and other undesirable
behaviors.329 With respect to investing information, anonymous posting
heightens the risk of fraud.330
On the other hand, efforts to manipulate the market through online
communications are not new,331 traditional sources of investment information
have proven similarly unreliable,332 and even professional investors are subject
to manipulation and cognitive biases.333 Perhaps most importantly, investors
seem aware of the risks associated with the lack of accountability on social
media. One empirical study found that investors rely less on information that is
posted anonymously, and that such posts have limited price effects.334 Another
study suggests that social media users respond most to posts by people who
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329
Biju Dominic, Anonymity on Social Media and Its Ugly Consequences, MINT (Feb. 10,
2021, 10:57 PM), https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/anonymity-on-social-mediaand-its-ugly-consequences-11612977615856.html [https://perma.cc/SG56-AV7E].
330
See, e.g., Investor Alert: Beware of Stock Recommendations on Investment Research
Websites, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/additionalresources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alert-beware-stock-recommendations
[https://perma.cc/D5AM-F23D] (warning of potential for fraud based on postings by authors
using pseudonyms or false credentials).
331
For example, a student comment details the widespread use of the internet in the 1990s,
including on-line chat rooms and discussion forums, to perpetrate securities fraud and
manipulation. Nancy Toross, Comment, Double-Click on This: Keeping Pace with On-line
Market Manipulation, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1417-29 (1999).
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develop a reputation for credibility.335 Research also suggests that the analyst
postings on social media are informative and that investors can trade profitably
on those beliefs.336 Although there is substantial heterogeneity in the quality of
postings, investors have some ability to identify the high quality sources of
information.337 Similarly, it appears that issuers may benefit from social media
as a source of information, gaining the ability, in some cases, to improve their
operations as a result of the “collective wisdom of the Reddit chatroom.”338
Although empirical studies of the GameStop frenzy are ongoing, early results
do not indicate social media is distinctively problematic as an information
source; rather, investor use of these sources is consistent with their overall
reliance on online sources of information, including Twitter, Reddit, TikTok,
and more. The likely message from the GameStop frenzy is that the SEC, like
other regulators, must pay continued attention to the use of social media
platforms. Social media use by securities professionals, corporate officials, and
people who are trading the securities about which they post warrants particular
oversight. Notably, issuers are increasingly using social media to communicate
with their investors and to combat misinformation.339 The SEC might follow
their lead and consider engaging directly with social media to monitor ongoing
developments, play a role in educating investors about how to determine the
reliability of posts, and even flag posts that are particularly suspect. These
developments also warrant consideration of greater collaboration between the
SEC and other regulators that are confronting the challenges presented by social
media platforms, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal
Communications Commission.340
B.

Digital Engagement Practices

A potentially bigger concern is when retail investing is the product of
affirmative manipulation. Some commentators have warned that apps nudge
investor behavior or seek to make certain stocks or trading activities more
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attractive.341 The Massachusetts enforcement action against Robinhood is
premised, in large part, on the allegedly manipulative aspects of its trading
platform.342 The SEC’s request for public input on DEP solicited information on
how a variety of digital features, ranging from celebrations for trading such as
“digital confetti” to games, leaderboards and curated lists, will influence investor
behavior.343
While concerns over the ability of app-based platforms to influence investing
behavior are undoubtedly valid, the same can be said of most consumer-directed
behavior, including product information, credit card offers, and pharmaceutical
advertising. Many businesses offer free products to induce consumers to make
additional purchases, making it hard to distinguish Robinhood’s free stock from
Dunkin’ Donuts’ free coffee.344 A paternalistic approach that regulates or limits
business activity because of its capacity to influence behavior sweeps far more
broadly than fintech. Moreover, that the platform provider has a financial motive
in encouraging the targeted behavior does not distinguish trading platforms.
Credit card companies encourage their customers to borrow, even to the point of
incurring excessive debt, so they can make money from the high interest rates
they charge on that debt.345 Pharmaceutical companies hope that people will
demand costly prescription drugs from their doctors based on what they see on
television.346
The power of platforms to gather customer-specific information and then to
use that information to exploit vulnerabilities presents a distinct concern. A
brokerage app can collect information on a customer’s trading patterns, predict
which types of securities the customer is most likely to buy, and target that
customer with recommendations for more of those types of securities.347
341
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Similarly, an app can target investors who are likely to use derivatives or
purchase securities on margin. This targeting can both generate additional
revenues for the broker and enable the broker to target those investors who are
receptive to a particular pitch or trading strategy. Although app-based brokers
would seem to distance a brokerage firm from the interpersonal interactions that
generate this knowledge and may leave a customer unaware that the information
is being collected or used, the technology used by a brokerage platform may
allow a firm to collect substantial information on customer preferences, trading
patterns, and responses to nudges and cues. The platform can then use artificial
intelligence to respond to that information. In particular, while an app can use
the information to encourage behavior that is in the customer’s best interests, it
can also encourage behavior that is inconsistent with its knowledge of the
customer for its own financial benefit.
Again, this acquisition and use of customer data is not unique to trading apps.
Amazon collects data on its customers and uses those data to generate
“predictive suggestions for products and services that each user might be
inclined to purchase.”348 Cambridge Analytica obtained user data from
Facebook that it then used to create targeted messages to voters in the 2016
presidential election.349 Target received negative publicity for collecting
information that it used to predict when its customers were pregnant to send
them maternity advertisements.350 The technology used in these examples is
powerful, and it may be a matter of algorithmic programming that is not visible
in the same way as overt verbal or written actions.351 As with other artificial
intelligence-type tools, platform regulation should ensure that providers are held
accountable for the impact of their design features without requiring proof that
those features were deliberately designed to exploit or defraud.
Existing broker-dealer regulations limit brokers’ ability to engage in this type
of targeting. When brokers make recommendations or provide investment
advice to customers, they must adhere to certain legal standards because of their
potential influence on customer behavior. Brokers have an obligation to know
their customers and to determine that their recommendations are suitable for the
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targeted investors.352 The SEC adopted Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”) in
2019 requiring brokers to comply with a “best interest” standard.353 Reg BI also
limits how brokers can be compensated for their recommendations.354
What constitutes a recommendation is not clear. In adopting Reg BI, the SEC
stated that the definition is “not susceptible to a bright line test” and depends on
the specific “facts and circumstances” of a particular situation.355 A
recommendation need not be explicit; if a digital design or function suggests an
investment or strategy, that design may constitute a recommendation.356 A key
issue in the determination of whether Reg BI applies is the degree to which a
communication is individually tailored. The SEC explained: “The more
individually tailored the communication to a specific customer or a targeted
group of customers about a security or group of securities, the greater the
likelihood that the communication may be viewed as a ‘recommendation.’”357
One of the risks of manipulation lies in the potential for an app-based broker to
use customer information to provide targeted recommendations without
complying with Reg BI. Indeed, Robinhood has explicitly maintained that it
does not use artificial intelligence to recommend securities or investment
strategies, implicitly recognizing that, to do so, would warrant regulatory
scrutiny concerning its compliance with these legal standards.358
Brokers have greater obligations with respect to margin loans and options
trading. FINRA rules require brokers affirmatively to approve customer
accounts for options trading and, in doing so, to exercise due diligence in

352
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determining whether options trading is appropriate for that account.359 FINRA
rules provide that brokers must require customers to meet minimum deposit
requirements to open a margin account, limit the extent of leverage associated
with such an account in accordance with Regulation T, and maintain minimum
margin requirements on an ongoing basis.360 Brokers are also required to review
the need to impose higher margin requirements, if necessary, for individual
accounts or securities.361 The upshot of these rules is to require that brokers
oversee the level of risk associated with their customers’ trading activity.
Automation should not be used as a tool for evading that oversight function.
C.

Financial Literacy

A final concern is that retail investors will be particularly vulnerable to
exploitation both by fraudsters on social media and app-based brokerage firms
because of their lack of financial literacy. Investor financial literacy is an
ongoing challenge.362 Retail investors lack the basic skills necessary to manage
their money, use credit cards, and handle mortgages and retirement savings.
Policymakers and researchers have struggled to identify tools for improving
financial literacy, but many education and outreach efforts have shown limited
success.363
One of the challenges with app-based trading is that investors tend to have
limited understanding even of the products they are using. FINRA’s survey
reported, for example, that a substantial number of investors surveyed did not
know whether their investment account charged commissions, whether they had
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ever purchased fractional shares, or whether their account allowed them to
purchase securities on margin.364
App-based brokers see themselves not as the problem but as the solution.
Robinhood explains that many of its “digital features are designed to promote
financial literacy and investment awareness,” features that include Robinhood
Learn, In-App Education, and Robinhood Snacks.365 Webull describes its in-app
community platforms as enabling its customers to learn from each other.366 As
one commentator explains, these platforms that are designed for self-directed
investors are increasingly offering “embedded education” tools that provide
such investors with direction, research, and analysis to assist the decisionmaking process.367 These tools can dramatically increase the practical
accessibility of capital market participation for retail investors.
But fintech can do more. App-based platforms have the capability of
providing just-in-time information—information that is provided to an investor
at the time the investor enters a trade, seeks a quote on an option, or considers
funding a trade through margin lending. Just-in-time information has been
shown to improve the effectiveness of financial education because investors
have access to the educational material when it is decision-relevant.368 Apps
could encourage investors to reconsider risky or unusual investment decisions
with a pop-up asking “are you sure?” An investor who indicated uncertainty
could then be directed to a source of additional information. Apps could use the
same features that have been criticized as overly engaging—bright colors,
confetti, and easy-to-use designs—to reward customers for accessing
educational material or demonstrating their mastery of financial concepts. Appbased platforms also have the ability to make financial education interactive. An
ongoing challenge with disclosure-based regulation is that, even if regulations
mandate valuable disclosures, many investors do not read them. Apps could
provide questions or tools that require investors to demonstrate their familiarity
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with the disclosures before being approved for trading certain types of
instruments or increasing their level of risk exposure.369
Regulators could also “nudge” fintech in this direction. Rather than
constraining innovation through new regulations or enforcement actions,
regulators could encourage the development of greater educational tools, and
perhaps a demonstration that those tools are being used effectively to improve
customer financial literacy. Investor education requirements could be imposed
as an alternative sanction to fines or license revocations. Demonstrated
effectiveness in financial education could also provide brokers with safe harbor
protection with respect to requirements such as suitability or Reg BI.
In sum, the GameStop frenzy offers new reasons to think carefully about what
motivates retail investing decisions and how to motivate investors to make better
ones. By engaging with the tools provided by social media and trading apps,
regulators can encourage retail investors to reemerge in the capital markets and
serve as a mechanism for constructive change.
CONCLUSION
The GameStop frenzy is very much a product of new developments in the
capital markets, particularly the role of fintech and social media. These
developments show considerable promise in reducing barriers to retail
participation in those markets. The reemergence of the retail investor, moreover,
has the promise of affecting not just capital market behavior, but the way public
corporations are run.
Whether this promise will be realized remains to be seen and depends in part
on developments in retail engagement¾not just in trading, but in voting shares.
It also depends on the extent to which regulators take action to restrict the
innovations that have led to broader market participation. This Article has
argued that the rationale for such restrictions is unconvincing and motivated
largely by a misplaced skepticism about retail trading. At the same time, this
Article identifies potential opportunities for regulators to improve the retail
investor experience and to learn from the costs as well as the benefits of retail
ownership.
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